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The realization requirement is the income tax’s original sin.  Although long-
standing, it is widely considered the main source of tax complexity, inequity, and 
economic distortion.  Despite these problems, realization is also considered a 
fundamental element of modern income tax regimes.  It is explained early in most federal 
income tax courses as necessitated by problems of asset valuation and taxpayer liquidity.  
To the dismay of certain professors, this explanation usually generates little class 
discussion.  More worrisome, it is also widely accepted outside the classroom—
prompting few political objections or normative academic inquiries. 
The goal of this article is to provide a normative framework that allows 
policymakers to better understand the role of the realization requirement.  It makes two 
related arguments.  First, with respect to certain emotionally non-fungible (personal) 
assets, the realization requirement is normatively justified because the market price is not 
a good indication of the assets’ value to their owners.  Second, contrary to the traditional 
view of realization as a regressive element, taxing only these personal assets upon 
realization would promote income tax progressivity.  This article’s normative approach 
provides a basis for developing a more effective and coherent redistributive income tax 
policy.  This analysis contributes to the broader tax reform debate and opens a novel 
theoretical inquiry with respect to the distributive impact of different types of errors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a legal arrangement that transfers a huge percentage of the federal 
budget to wealthy Americans, is inefficient, results in complexity, and encourages 
dishonesty.  Further imagine that when called upon to explain the arrangement’s 
objectives, policymakers, professionals, and academics merely shrug and reply that it is 
technical in nature and driven by administrative convenience.  Would you expect the 
arrangement to last for even a day?  Certainly not if it were part of the federal spending 
budget.  However, the realization requirement has created exactly such a situation in the 
federal income tax context for over a century.  This article critiques the academic 
literature dealing with realization and offers a new understanding of the requirement’s 
function: realization is another way to promote distributive justice within the tax regime.  
This insight provides policymakers a normative basis from which to combat the 
realization requirement’s negative effects in a principled way.  It also raises the broader 
question of the role that the market prices of various assets should have in determining 
distributive policies. 
The realization requirement means that tax liability is assessed only when assets 
are exchanged on the market, and not, as an “ideal” income tax would dictate, when the 
market values of assets change.1  This seemingly simple requirement is the most “well 
established, and yet so widely criticized” attribute of our income tax regime.2  It has been 
called the Achilles’ Heel of the income tax3 and is widely considered to be the primary 
source of distributional inequity and complexity in the tax system.4  Our main argument 
is that, contrary to the widely held view that the realization requirement is merely an 
administrative rule, realization is actually normatively justified with respect to certain 
assets—emotionally non-fungible (personal) assets.  Personal assets are those assets for 
which there is a high probability that the subjective value individuals attribute to them 
differs significantly from the market value.  We argue that taxing these assets only upon 
realization helps the income tax to better achieve its professed objective of progressivity. 
A preliminary example demonstrates the realization requirement’s normative 
basis.  Consider two family vacation albums, the first made by a talented professional 
photographer and the second created by her spouse, a lawyer.  The photographer’s album 
is filled with well-composed landscape shots and insightful portraits that many galleries 
would love to display, whereas the lawyer’s is comprised mostly of poorly framed shots 
of distracted children that even the grandparents tire of.  Nevertheless, both the 
photographer and the lawyer seem to derive the same amount of subjective value from 
their albums.  
                                                      
1 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 154 (6th ed. 2009); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 722, 723-29 (1990); David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of Financial 
Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 400 (2004); David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1549, 1551 (1998); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules under the 
Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 12 (1992); David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax 
System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95, 95 (1999). 
2 Schizer, supra note 1, at 1551. 
3 See William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278, 280 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield 
eds., 1983) (calling the realization requirement the Achilles’ Heel of income taxation). 
4 See infra Part I.A. 
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It seems intuitively wrong to increase the tax liability of the photographer only 
because her album has considerable market value.  That is, as long as both albums are 
sitting on coffee tables in the family’s living rooms, it seems unreasonable to increase the 
photographer’s tax liability for the year simply because her personal album could fetch 
thousands of dollars, especially if she has no interest in selling it.  However, under what 
is often described as an ideal income tax, the photographer would pay taxes in the year 
she compiled the album, because the album has the effect of increasing her net worth.   
But taxing her for the value of the album’s photos becomes completely 
reasonable if she sells the exclusive rights to the photos, in which case it would be 
difficult to distinguish it from any other work she sells.5  With respect to the album, 
realization does not increase or diminish the value or the nature of the photos—at least to 
the photographer.  It only changes the type of the asset from a personal to a commercial 
one.  This change signals that the asset’s value to the taxpayer is not different from its 
market value.  
We expand the example slightly to demonstrate why the realization requirement 
cannot be normatively justified with respect to all assets.  Imagine that the photographer 
and the professor each hold a hundred shares of Apple stock and that the stock has 
increased significantly in value over the past year.  The fundamental (and intuitive) 
difference between the owners’ perceptions of their photo albums (personal assets that 
will likely never be sold) and their stocks (investment assets that they hold solely for 
financial reasons) suggests that it would not be wrong to tax them for any wealth increase 
associated with the stock, even if they chose not to sell this year.   
Currently, the realization requirement shields both types of wealth accumulation 
from taxation until the asset is sold, but we argue that this delay is only justifiable with 
respect to the category of personal assets, such as the photo album.  Recognizing this 
overlooked function of the realization requirement—allowing taxpayers to defer taxes on 
unique personal assets—provides policymakers with a valuable point of departure when 
deciding which assets should be subject to realization and which should not.  
Articulating a normative basis for the requirement is certainly timely, as recent 
policy proposals claim the problems of realization prevent the income tax from meeting 
its distributive and efficiency goals, arguing that policymakers should abandon the 
income tax altogether and shift to a (less progressive)6 consumption tax system.7  
Scholars have debated the merits of realization for some time but mostly from the 
standpoint of assessing the practicalities of moving away from it.  Some, such as Daniel 
Shaviro and Edward Zelinsky, view realization as a necessary and manageable 
weakness.8  Others, such as Noel Cunningham, Deborah Schenck, Daniel Halperin,  
                                                      
5 See infra Part III.B (arguing that her acceptance of the market value would be a signal that the 
market price is a good indicator for measuring her economic well-being). 
6 Chris W. Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 
63 TAX L. REV. 867 (2010).  However, some scholars claim that the inherent regressivity of the consumption 
tax base could be balanced, and perhaps even reversed, by a much more progressive rate structure.  See 
Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines, The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1031 (2010). 
7 See Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income 
Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789, 789–91 (2007); Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a 
Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91 (2004).  See also William D. Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (1974).  
8 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 66; Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral 
Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 862 (1997).  
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David Shakow, and David Weisbach, think that the income tax should gradually shift 
away from realization.9  As policymakers consider decreasing the set of assets subject to 
realization, they should be guided by some commonly accepted baseline principles.  
Although scholars disagree about the proper role of realization moving forward, 
there is consensus on three main issues.  First, most of the income tax’s shortcomings are 
a direct result of the realization requirement.10  Therefore, as long as realization is part of 
the income tax regime, problems of complexity, planning, inequity, and inefficiency are 
inevitable.11  Second, there can be no practical income taxation without realization, so at 
least some assets will always be taxed only upon realization.12  Third, all tax scholars, 
with the exception of David Schizer,13 seem to accept that realization has no theoretical 
or policy underpinnings and that it is merely a second-best solution driven primarily by 
concerns about asset valuation and taxpayer liquidity.14  
This article challenges the third of these views and raises some important 
implications regarding the other two.  It calls for applying the realization requirement in a 
fundamentally different way and suggests some substantial, yet feasible, policy reforms 
that would allow the tax system to better achieve its distributional objectives.  It expands 
upon a previous article that deals with the taxation of earning capacity, examining how 
tax policy can be advanced with respect to the realization principle.15  
Admittedly, from a “pure” income tax perspective, taxing personal assets only 
upon realization rather than as their market value changes provides their owners with 
deferral and other tax benefits.16  However, we argue that these benefits may be justified 
because they are progressively distributed.17  The intuition behind this argument is that 
                                                      
9 See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation without Realization: A 
“Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 799–800 (1992); Daniel Halperin, Saving the 
Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 501 (1998); David J. Shakow, Taxation 
without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1114-15 (1986); Weisbach, 
supra note 1, at 99. 
10 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 9, at 728; Edward D. Kleinbard & Thomas L. Evans, The 
Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a Realization Based Tax System, 75 TAXES 788, 789 (1997) 
(identifying realization as the root of many tax evils).  See also Joseph Bankman, What Can We Say About a 
Wealth Tax?, 53 TAX L. REV. 477, 477 (2000); Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1559, 1559 (1996); Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration 
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571, 631–32 (1995); Shakow, supra note 9, at 111–13. 
11 For example, the realization requirement is often cited as the main reason for capital gains.  See 
Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 647 (2002); Edward J. 
McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 896 (2005) (arguing that under an income-
with-realization tax, some preference for capital gains is needed).  A recent realization-related debate 
concerns the profit interest compensation of hedge fund managers.  The main issue was whether the 
managers received something of value before cashing their profits.  See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: 
Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
12 See Halperin, supra note 9, at 503; Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization 
Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355, 364-65 (2004); Shakow, supra note 9, at 1144; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 7; 
Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 876. 
13 See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1552–53. 
14 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 9, at 499; Schenk, supra note 12, at 355–56; Schenk, supra note 
10, at 629; Shakow, supra note 9, at 1114; Weisbach, supra note 1, at 95.  
15 See Ilan Benshalom & Kendra Stead, Values and (Market) Valuations: A Critique of the 
Endowment Tax Consensus, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1511 (2011).   
16 See supra note 1.  For a comprehensive analysis of this point, see Part I.A. 
17 This is true even if the market value of family albums (and other personal assets) owned by high 
net worth individuals may be greater than the value of albums owned by most taxpayers.  See infra Part 
III.C–D. 
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granting a tax benefit to personal assets requires imposing higher effective tax rates on 
other assets—namely, investment capital assets.  Hence, if the tax system shifts to taxing 
personal assets upon realization and non-personal investment assets upon market-price 
fluctuation, the system would become more progressive.  This is because data about the 
distribution of assets strongly suggests that personal assets comprise most of low and 
medium income households’ assets while investment and capital assets are 
disproportionately owned by affluent taxpayers.18  By addressing realization as a question 
of distributive justice, this article connects existing tax practices to the theoretical bases 
of redistribution: the questions of what policymakers should seek to redistribute and how 
they should best measure it.  
It is worth emphasizing the difference between our approach and the more 
canonic arguments with respect to realization.  The bulk of the literature focuses on the 
difficulty of determining the market value of illiquid assets and describes the arbitrary tax 
assessments that would result from valuation error.  This article makes the point that the 
problem of assessment errors would still be relevant with respect to personal assets even 
if all assets had a verifiable market price.  We are concerned less with the consequences 
of inaccurate tax assessments and more with how different types of inaccuracies impact 
distribution.  Accordingly, the article highlights a consequence of errors that has not yet 
been addressed.  We contend that even if we had efficient markets for all assets, this 
improved accuracy would not be free of errors.  Including personal assets within the 
income tax base would decrease mistakes with respect to the market price valuations, but 
increase the probability of error with respect to the subjective value taxpayers attach to 
different assets. 19   The increased probability of that type of error would not be 
distributionally neutral, increasing the relative tax burden on low and middle income 
taxpayers.  
This analysis leads to the conclusion that realization may be justified with respect 
to personal assets but not with respect to investment assets.  The implication of this 
conclusion is that policymakers should consider applying the requirement very differently 
by taxing investment assets as they appreciate or depreciate in value rather than when 
they are sold.  Such a reform would significantly reduce the income tax’s current 
problems by making it less distortive, more consistent, and more equitable.  This article 
explains why such a system would not be any more difficult to maintain than the current 
tax regime, which also applies special rules to investment assets.  Hence, while our 
proposal raises some concerns, it also offers an administratively and politically plausible 
alternative that could be used to maintain the income tax as an effective wealth 
redistribution tool. 
Before launching into a full discussion of realization, we provide a brief 
overview of the broad issues reached in this article.  Part I describes the function and 
impact of the realization requirement, explains why it is the major source of income tax 
difficulties, and clarifies why it is viewed as solely the byproduct of tax administrative 
constraints.  Part II explores the academic literature with respect to realization.  It shows 
that all leading approaches are similarly incomplete because all view realization only as a 
                                                      
18 See infra Appendix and notes 46, 114.   
19 In other words, this suggests that market price is a tool—a proxy—for getting at individuals’ 
economic well-being.  However, as a proxy it should only be used when there are good reasons to believe it 
correlates well with well-being.   
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necessary evil.  It then argues that no reasonable income tax regime can be devised 
without understanding that realization can be justified in its own right.  
Parts III and IV develop this article’s analysis—the former develops the 
normative framework, and the latter extracts its policy implications.  Part III begins by 
explaining the difficulty of making interpersonal comparisons in a redistributive tax 
regime.  It then establishes two normative pillars of realization: the particular difficulty of 
making interpersonal comparisons with respect to personal assets and the progressivity 
gained by taxing only personal assets on a realization basis.  It ends by discussing a 
possible theoretical criticism of this article’s proposal—namely whether there are 
alternative ways to better attain tax progressivity.  Part IV explains the policy reform 
implications of this article’s normative analysis.  It also elaborates upon some empirical 
questions and points to some potential avenues of future research.  We close with several 
brief conclusions that highlight this article’s policy and theoretical contributions. 
I. THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT—COSTS AND ENDURANCES OF 
AN ACHILLES’ HEEL 
The realization requirement emerged in the early twentieth century and soon 
became a foundational attribute of all income tax regimes.20  In the United States, the 
requirement got an early endorsement from the Supreme Court, which found that 
imposition of the federal income tax was constitutionally limited to only realized gains.21  
The Court soon retreated from that position, however, and scholars widely agree that 
realization is not constitutionally mandated.22  In fact, Congress has successfully adopted 
many tax arrangements that impose taxes on unrealized profits.23  This part briefly 
explains the realization requirement’s operation, the tension it creates within the income 
tax, and its significant social costs.  It then presents the canonic explanation for how this 
“Achilles’ heel” of the income tax has endured in spite of its shortcomings.24  
A. The Function and Social Costs of the Realization Requirement 
This subpart describes the realization requirement as a transaction (rather than an 
income) tax and explains the enormous social costs this transactional element imposes 
upon the current regime.25   
A simple example may help illustrate how the realization requirement is 
implemented.  In 1991, a hypothetical relative of ours invested his small inheritance and 
pension savings in one company: AIG.  In 2001, the price of his shares had increased 
fifteen fold, and the hypothetical relative was doing great.  Not feeling any obligation to 
save, he was vacationing in the Caribbean, avoiding cheap hotels, taking big mortgages 
on his New York apartment and Florida mansion, considering early retirement, and 
                                                      
20 See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 
559 (1991).  See also I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
21 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
22 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (11th ed. 2009); Terrence R. 
Chorvat, Perception and Income: The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REV. 
75, 82 (2003) (providing a short survey of the erosion of the realization requirement’s constitutional 
protection); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 9, at 742. 
23 This includes the tax arrangements that governed the taxation of pass-through entities in the 
1950s (Subchapters K and S in the Internal Revenue Code) and the rules that govern the taxation of certain 
traded commodity futures and financial institutions.  Chorvat, supra note 22, at 83-86 (describing these 
examples). 
24 See Andrews, supra note 3, at 280. 
25 See Bankman, supra note 10, at 479; Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging 
Interest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 93–94 (1988); Weisbach, supra note 1, at 97. 
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planning to buy his kids new cars.  At family parties, we would all gossip about his wife, 
saying how lucky she was to marry such a clever investor.  By 2011, however, things 
have radically changed for the hypothetical relative—the Caribbean seems as distant as 
the moon, the kids have to take out huge student loans, he rarely attends family 
festivities, and when his ex-wife does, we all gossip about how unfortunate she is to have 
married such a reckless speculator.  
Over the last twenty years, the hypothetical relative’s life has been a roller 
coaster, yet one thing has remained stable: his tax liability.  Because of the realization 
requirement, he paid no income taxes and received no deductions with respect to his 
holdings in AIG throughout those years.  In contrast, under a “mark-to-market” tax 
regime, the unfortunate relative would have been required to pay taxes (and been able to 
deduct losses) as the value of his investments changed.  Mark-to-market tax treatment 
may not seem intuitive, but it is sensible because the gains and losses of the hypothetical 
relative reflected real changes in his economic purchasing power.26  True, he could not 
have paid his grocery bills with AIG stock, but he could have sold any amount of the 
stock at any point in order to do so.  More importantly, he borrowed against the stock and 
used the loan proceeds for consumption.27  Simply put, while his stock was not equivalent 
to money, it was viewed by this relative, and basically everyone else, as being almost as 
good. 
It is widely accepted among economists and tax professionals that taxpayers’ 
economic incomes increase as their assets appreciate, not just when those assets are 
sold.28  To the extent that individuals’ increase in wealth is a good proxy for their well-
being—and therefore a relevant benchmark for taxation—taxpayers’ realized gains and 
cash flows are (from a pure income tax perspective) beside the point.29  
The principle that all accretions to wealth should be measured by an income tax 
creates an interesting tension.  If policymakers wish to use the income tax to generate 
revenue, they should try to avoid giving it a transactional dimension, meaning that 
taxation should not depend on when taxpayers choose to put assets on the market.30  
Transactional elements are problematic because taxpayers can time and structure 
exchanges and sales.  That is, transactional taxation gives taxpayers considerable ability 
to control how and when to pay the taxes.  
                                                      
26 There may be some question over how sensible it is to collect taxes and then turn them back 
when losses appear if there is significant value fluctuation and a progressive tax rate is employed. See Jeffrey 
B. Liebman, Should Taxes Be Based on Lifetime Income? Vickrey Taxation Revisited (December 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/vickreydec2003.pdf.  
27 See McCaffery, supra note 11, at 888. 
28 This concept calculates taxpayers’ income in a given period by measuring their overall 
consumption and net increase in the fair market value of their assets.  Haig-Simons taxation focuses on asset 
appreciation and depreciation, not on whether the assets were sold.  It would therefore not include a 
realization requirement.  See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS 
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economics and Legal 
Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921). 
29 There is a wide consensus that an ideal income tax would adopt the Haig-Simons concept of the 
income tax base.  See, e.g., GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 1, at 97; Fellows, supra note 1, at 723–24; 
Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45, 48 (1996); 
Schenk, supra note 10, at 631–32; Michael J. Stepek, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification and the 
Future Viability of Accrual Taxation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 779, 785–86 (1987); Weisbach, supra note 1, 
at 95.  This concept calculates taxpayers’ income in a given period by measuring their overall consumption 
and net increase in the fair market value of their assets.  
30 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
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The current realization-based income tax system aims to levy tax according to 
individuals’ incomes, but in fact it relies on transactional realization triggers that may 
have nothing to do with income.31  This tax regime, however, is not truly transactional 
either, because it requires that assets appreciate in value for the tax to be triggered.  
Under the current system, taxes are only paid if a transaction occurred and gains were 
realized.  This dual requirement grants taxpayers the ability to structure their transactions 
to attain certain tax advantages that would not be available to them in either a pure 
income tax regime or a pure transactional tax regime.32  
The inherent conflict between the measurement of actual income and the 
transactional element of realization makes the current realization-based income tax 
unworkable.  Policymakers find it difficult to generate broad rules that reconcile the two 
notions and are therefore unable to generate coherent rules explaining what types of 
transactions amount to a realization event.33  
In terms of efficiency, the realization requirement leads well-informed and self-
interested taxpayers to sub-optimally invest their resources in order to attain higher after-
tax returns.34  The realization requirement also distorts the timing of asset dispositions.35  
Taxpayers can also defer the recognition of gains but selectively sell depreciated assets to 
enjoy the value of their losses—a practice typically referred to as strategic trading.36  The 
potential for manipulation introduced by the realization requirement compels the tax 
authority to introduce complex loss-limitation rules to protect the revenue base.  These 
rules disallow the deduction of losses incurred with respect to certain investments, thus 
making them inherently riskier and deterring some (potentially less well-advised) 
taxpayers from making those investments.37  Finally, the realization requirement results 
in significant revenue loss that has to be compensated for—either by inefficient higher 
marginal tax rates38 or lower (sub-optimal) public investment.39  
In terms of complexity and uncertainty, the transactional element introduced by 
the realization requirement materially complicates the income tax’s implementation.40  
Policymakers’ attempts to rein in problems stemming from the realization requirement 
are the hidden drivers of many notoriously complex provisions and regulations.  In terms 
of deferral, the attempt to tax individuals only on their realized gains and losses raises the 
                                                      
31 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for 
Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1893 (2004) (describing one method by which wealthy taxpayers can 
reduce their tax liability that is not available to those with less planning advice and fewer assets).   
32 Unless there are strong non-tax considerations involved, taxpayers will exercise these tax options 
in a way that increases their overall profit.  Schizer, supra note 1, at 1555–63 (adding that realization allows 
taxpayers to blunt the penalty of inflation in a tax regime that assigns tax liabilities according to nominal 
amounts).  See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 
185–89 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the ability of businesses to choose between two inventory accounting 
methods in order to minimize their tax liability without affecting their actual business practices). 
33 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1627, 1633–45 (1999). 
34 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 32, at 70–73, 107–08; Fellows, supra note 1, at 727; Weisbach, supra 
note 1, at 100.  
35 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.  
36 Shaviro, supra note 1, at 4.   
37 Land, supra note 29, at 51.  
38 See infra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
39 See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 
1064–70 (2009) (discussing what comprises an optimal allocation of public goods). 
40 Stepek, supra note 29, at 779. 
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question of when investors in companies actually realize the profits of their investments.  
In fact, two of the most complex areas of law, corporate and partnership taxation, would 
be almost completely unnecessary absent the realization requirement.41  As mentioned, 
any realization-based income tax regime needs loss-limitation rules to protect its revenue 
base against strategic trading.42  Over the years, many loss-limitation rules have been 
enacted to curb tax planning with respect to income generated from passive investments 
and financial assets.43  The rules formulated, however, are so staggeringly complex that 
commentators have voiced skepticism as to whether they can be enforced in even a 
marginally coherent way.44  As difficult as these issues are, the above examples are just 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of realization’s costs.  
In terms of equity, this distortion and complexity significantly reduce the ability 
of the income tax to effectively promote fairness objectives.  If the income tax is 
expected to tax individuals according to changes in their economic well-being, then the 
realization requirement is an obvious obstacle.  First, it provides a tax deferral benefit to 
successful investors who enjoy real, unrealized gains and (through loss-restriction rules) 
denies deductions to investors who suffer and realize actual losses.  Second, since 
unrealized gains are frequently associated with capital assets, realization reduces the 
effective tax rate on capital.45  Because the majority of capital assets are owned by 
affluent taxpayers, the realization requirement provides a tax benefit that is primarily 
skewed toward the wealthy.46  Consequently, in the current tax regime, the realization 
requirement is justly viewed as an inherently regressive feature that hinders the income 
tax’s wealth redistribution objectives.47 
The realization requirement and its byproducts undermine the integrity of the 
income tax regime in almost every respect.  Instead of promoting distributive justice and 
ensuring efficient allocation of resources, the realization requirement and its host of 
problems create the perception that the tax code is a wasteful and arbitrary body of law.  
The discontinuities created by the requirement have given rise to a socially wasteful tax-
                                                      
41 Fellows, supra note 1, at 728; Jeffrey Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of 
Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 628–630 (1990); Land, supra note 29, at 54; Schenk, supra note 12, 
at 369 (“If C corporations and pass-through entities were valued annually, almost all of subchapters C, S, and 
K could be repealed.”).  
42 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
43 The mobility and fungibility of those assets, along with financers’ unlimited ability to infinitely 
slice and dice them, lead to fears that tax planners can structure cash flow positions without realizing income.  
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 1, at 623–26; Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You 
Disagree: Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 
1219–20 (2010).   
44 The passive loss restrictions and various constructive ownership and sale requirements with 
respect to financial instruments are additional examples of the remarkably complex rules that aim to control 
selective loss realization.  GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 1, at 391–93. 
45 Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. 
REV. 17, 41 (1996).  
46 See G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA? (last updated 
Nov. 2011),  http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html, for distributional tables showing 
that, in 2004, the top 1% of U.S. citizens in terms of net worth controlled 34.3% of the country’s overall 
wealth; George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, 
Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419, 492–93 (1993). 
47 Chorvat, supra note 22, at 91.  See generally David Kamin, What Is a Progressive Tax Change?: 
Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241 (2008) (discussing different 
criteria for what may be considered a progressive change in the tax system). 
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planning industry.48  Given realization’s obvious and harmful faults, one can only wonder 
why policymakers have not seriously considered any meaningful alternative.  
B. Technical in Nature—The Valuation Liquidity Consensus 
Tax academics widely perceive the realization requirement as having little, if 
any, theoretical or policy justification.  Nevertheless, contemporary tax scholarship rarely 
takes on the requirement, adopting a “cross we must bear” approach to its problems.  
Realization’s endurance is generally explained in terms of two tax-administration 
concerns: problems of low taxpayer liquidity and the technical difficulty of valuing 
assets.49  This subpart briefly explains and evaluates these views. 
 With respect to liquidity, realization makes the tax collection process relatively 
easy because it avoids the tax-without-cash problem.  Assets are typically exchanged for 
cash, so taxpayers have the necessary cash to cover the tax liability at the time of sale.50  
In contrast, a mark-to-market regime may force cash-poor taxpayers to sell assets to pay 
their tax liabilities on unrealized profits.  Hence, a mark-to-market system would require 
policymakers and tax authorities to undertake a politically unpopular and legally 
complicated position of dealing with some taxpayers’ inability to produce the cash 
necessary to pay taxes.  Much of the political traction of the income tax relates to the way 
it considers taxpayers’ ability to pay and, through the realization requirement, does not 
disrupt taxpayers’ affairs by requiring them to sell assets or borrow money to pay their 
taxes. 
Problems associated with taxpayers’ liquidity could be dealt with in a mark-to-
market system.  While low liquidity is not a completely manufactured problem, leading 
scholars have convincingly argued that problems associated with liquidity are not 
substantial enough to justify the broad imposition of the realization requirement.51  For 
example, under a mark-to-market regime, taxpayers would be likely to structure their 
investment and borrowing transactions in ways that addressed liquidity concerns by 
making sure that they had sufficient funds to pay their taxes. 52  Additionally, lawmakers 
could provide exceptions with respect to certain assets (e.g., residential homes, closely 
held corporations).  Such provisions would assure that liquidity-constrained taxpayers 
who owned certain appreciated assets were not required to pay the tax until they sold the 
asset.53  These exceptions could be structured so that when the assets are eventually sold, 
the gains are taxed at nominal rates (as occurs under the current tax regime).  
Alternatively, they could be taxed at higher effective tax rates that tried to capture the 
value of deferral.54 
                                                      
48 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 131; David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. 
REV. 215, 222–26 (2002).  
49 See Chorvat, supra note 22, at 91–92; Schenk, supra note 12, at 360–70 (exploring these 
justifications and concluding that neither completely explains the requirement); Shakow, supra note 9, at 
1118; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 5, 12–13; Weisbach, supra note 1, at 95–96; Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 879. 
50 Schenk, supra note 10, at 630. 
51 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 12, at 360–65; Shakow, supra note 9, at 1167–76; Weisbach, supra 
note 1, at 96.   
52 Schenk, supra note 12, at 362.  
53 Shakow, supra note 9, at 1167–76.  But see Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 892 (noting that the 
Internal Revenue Service may find it very difficult to evaluate taxpayers’ liquidity). 
54 As mentioned earlier, the deferred payment grants taxpayers the benefit of enjoying the time 
value of money.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.  The economic value of this benefit to the 
taxpayer could easily be computed through basic finance theory principles.  While the tax assessment could 
be made on an annual basis, the taxes could be paid only when the asset was sold.  The tax liability would be 
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The stronger argument in support of the realization requirement is that a mark-to-
market regime would require burdensome annual asset appraisal.  A coherent tax that 
accounted for accrued gains and losses would involve huge administrative costs 
associated with valuation.55  Even the scholars who are most optimistic about the 
prospect of abolishing the realization requirement and shifting to a mark-to-market 
regime agree that certain types of intangible assets are very difficult, perhaps impossible, 
to value with sufficient accuracy.56  This difficulty raises significant questions about 
whether valuation provided by taxpayers could be trustworthy—a serious concern in a tax 
regime dependent on self-assessment.57  If the realization requirement were abolished, 
one could expect a significant increase in the amount of fact intensive, valuation related 
litigation between tax authorities and taxpayers.58  
The realization requirement avoids these valuation problems because the price an 
unrelated buyer pays for the asset in a market exchange provides a strong indication of 
the asset’s actual value.  By focusing only on the price garnered in actual transactions, a 
realization-based income tax allows tax authorities and taxpayers to avoid lengthy, costly, 
and inaccurate valuation processes.  However, this type of audit accuracy comes at a cost.  
In order to rely on unrelated parties’ willingness to pay, tax authorities must wait, often 
ignoring significant gains for many years.  Unlike problems of liquidity, problems of 
valuation remain a major obstacle to implementing a mark-to-market income tax regime.  
While not denying their salience, we note that valuation problems are likely to 
play an increasingly smaller role in tax policy moving forward.  First, the problem of 
valuation is constantly decreasing because the scope of information markets is rapidly 
growing, and asset valuation methods are improving over time.  In fact, because of these 
two phenomena, many assets that once were considered impossible to value now have 
established market prices.59  Second, the investment patterns of society have shifted.60  
Rather than investing in concentrated private ventures, individuals now invest large 
shares of their wealth in diversified portfolios of publicly traded assets.61  This shift 
means that far more of the wealth held by individuals has an established market price.  
Furthermore, certain taxpayers, especially firms, already engage in fair market valuation 
of their assets for tax and non-tax reporting purposes.62  This does not suggest that a shift 
                                                                                                                                                 
calculated with reference to the nominal gain and the economic value of deferring the tax payment.  Shakow, 
supra note 9, at 1176. 
55 See Schenk, supra note 10, at 630. 
56 See Brown, supra note 10, at 1587 (discussing the difficulties of determining the value of human 
capital assets).  See also Shakow, supra note 9, at 1157–58 (suggesting that intangibles should not fall within 
the scope of his proposed mark-to-market regime).  
57 See Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 887–88. 
58 Schizer, supra note 1, at 1594–95.  See also Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 881–82. 
59 See David Schmudde, Responding To the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 711 (2009) (describing the rise of the mortgage-backed securities market, 
which was once considered illiquid).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, 
Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971–74 (2005) (describing valuation 
strategies in information markets). 
60 See Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 
537, 542–45 (2003).  See also Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2000) (describing the development of two alternative theories of the firm as a 
result of the dispersion between public ownership of debt and stock).  
61 See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 60, at 547–54. 
62 For example, under the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires all public corporations to report financial statements according to the general 
accounting principles.  15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006).  Additionally, Treasury Regulation § 1.861–9T(h) gives tax 
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to a mark-to-market regime would not involve significant problems and administrative 
costs related to valuation difficulties.  It does signify, however, that the marginal costs of 
producing the extra valuations necessary for such a shift may be considerably lower 
today than they were in the past and, if the above trends continue, are likely to be still 
lower in the future. 
The mitigation of liquidity and valuation problems is undoubtedly the strongest 
explanation for the presence of the realization requirement in all income tax regimes.  
However, this subpart questions whether problems of valuation and liquidity justify the 
requirement’s broad application.63  This inquiry is necessary because the administrative 
concerns surrounding valuation and liquidity currently foreclose any normative or policy 
discussion about the appropriate role of the realization requirement.  
That realization undermines the redistributive function of the income tax regime, 
which is one of the most effective redistributive tools of modern liberal democracies,64 
should be a point of concern.  In our view, policymakers may find it beneficial to 
seriously reconsider the much deeper normative discussion of how realization promotes 
or impedes the income tax’s distributive objectives.65  
II. WITH IT OR WITHOUT IT? EXISTING APPROACHES TO REALIZATION 
Given the consensus that there is no normative justification for the realization 
requirement,66 the current theoretical discourse has centered on whether there is a way to 
remove the requirement while keeping the income tax.  This part identifies and evaluates 
two general approaches within contemporary literature.  The first advances the notion 
that the income tax regime is so irreparably broken because of the realization requirement 
that a shift toward a mark-to-market regime is desirable.  The second argues that such a 
shift would be unwise because the comparative costs of the alternatives to realization 
may be higher than initially meets the eye.  
This part reviews and critically assesses both approaches, observing that their 
proponents disagree about one issue: the comparative costs of the realization requirement 
and various mark-to-market regimes.  Both approaches accept the notion that the 
realization requirement merely represents an answer to administrative difficulties 
associated with liquidity and valuation.  Yet, as the final subpart argues, this acceptance 
is problematic because there are social costs to a century of stagnation in the tax 
discourse with respect to the realization requirement.  
A. Without It: A Less Realization-Based Income Tax Regime 
Commentators have advanced many proposals to reduce the tax distortions and 
inequities of the realization requirement.67  While they differ significantly, each proposal 
                                                                                                                                                 
benefits to U.S. multinationals that allocate their interest deductions—which requires them to undertake 
annual fair market valuation of all their domestic and foreign assets.  Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(h) (2009). 
63 See Halperin, supra note 9, at 499. 
64 See Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls 
Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 2013–14 (2004).  
65 Many prominent scholars have argued that the realization requirement has no normative basis.  
See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 9, at 742; Halperin, supra note 9, at 499; Schenk, supra note 10, 
at 629; Shakow, supra note 9, at 1114. 
66 See supra note 14. 
67 See generally Blum, supra note 25, at 93–94 (assessing the desirability and feasibility of using an 
interest charge to compensate taxpayers’ deferral); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 9 (advocating for the 
application of a presumptive tax on imputed income at the risk-free treasury rate to split ownership interests); 
Fellows, supra note 1, at 728 (offering a proposal for retrospective accrual taxation based on the assessment 
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contends that realization cannot be justified while simultaneously arguing that it should 
not be eliminated altogether.  
The argument underlying proposals for a shift to a mark-to-market regime is 
relatively straightforward and compelling.  Because they see no normative justification 
for the realization requirement, the commentators argue that the income tax regime 
should minimize realization’s social costs by limiting its role.  To do this, policymakers 
should engage in a cost–benefit analysis to determine whether it is possible to tax the 
value fluctuation of certain assets independent of realization.  This approach emphasizes 
that the administrative costs associated with valuation are often overstated.  Many assets, 
particularly publicly traded instruments, are actually quite easy to value.  This argument 
becomes stronger as public markets continue to grow in both scope and scale,68 and the 
relative size of portfolio investment continues to grow as well.69  
Advocates of broader mark-to-market taxation also emphasize that a tax based on 
changes in asset value would not require annual valuation of every asset.  There are a 
number of ways to indirectly reduce the tax benefit of deferral and the problem of lock-in 
without annual valuation of all assets.70  Further, inaccuracies in any one year would 
correct themselves over time and even out when the asset was ultimately sold, and since 
more assets would be valued, the impact of mispricing any specific asset would be 
greatly diminished.71  
Diminishing the costs of the realization requirement would reduce some of its 
social costs and would result in a broader, more comprehensive tax base,72 which would 
allow policymakers to maintain the same level of revenues while reducing high marginal 
tax rates (and their associated work disincentives).73  
                                                                                                                                                 
of when the asset appreciates in value); Land, supra note 29, at 47 (proposing a form of retrospective taxation 
that grants the government an equity share in the time-adjusted gains at the time of the sale); David S. Miller, 
A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 TAX NOTES 1047 (2005) (arguing that affluent 
individuals, public companies, and medium-sized private companies would be required to mark-to-market 
their publicly traded property and derivatives); Weisbach, supra note 1 (examining whether it is feasible to 
expand mark-to-market taxation to cover most liquid assets while leaving hard-to-value assets such as real 
estate and small businesses on the realization system). 
68 Benshalom & Stead, supra note 15, at 1557. 
69 See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 60, at 542–45. 
70 Periodic assessment and reliance on presumptive statistical appraisals should provide a good 
proxy for changes in taxpayers’ portfolios.  Furthermore, exemptions for low value assets (e.g., consumer 
durables), could also reduce administrative costs without significant revenue implications.  See Shakow, 
supra note 9, at 1121–23.  A mark-to-market regime could also be administered through special arrangements 
for assets for which valuation seemed completely implausible.  Extremely difficult to value assets—such as 
artwork—could be taxed on a realization basis with measures to correct for deferral.  Another possibility 
would be to use an ex post retrospective approach that taxed the value of deferral—meaning that when the 
assets were sold the tax liability would be calculated based on certain assumptions with respect to when the 
value accumulated.  For example, tax authorities could operate under a rebuttable assumption that assets had 
straight-line appreciation.  Taxpayers who realized profits later would face higher nominal tax liabilities, 
because they would be taxed on the assumed tax value of money they attained by deferring realization.  
Alternatively, investments could face presumptive tax on their expected return—investors would have to pay 
a tax on their expected benefits, and the total tax liability could later be modified according to the actual price 
at which the asset was realized.  For such a proposal see Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on 
Capital, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007). 
71 See Shakow, supra note 9, at 1118. 
72 See Weisbach, supra note 1, at 122.  For example, expanded use of mark-to-market methods 
would call into question the need for non-recognition transactions and favorable capital gains rates. 
73 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1921 (1987). 
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The argument for a shift to a mark-to-market regime is undeniably strong,74 but 
also materially incomplete.  It fails to give sufficient weight to two important points.  
First, none of the proposals advocates a shift to a comprehensive mark-to-market regime, 
and the claim that comprehensive mark-to-market taxation would be beneficial says little, 
if anything, about whether a shift to a partial regime would be positive.  A partial mark-
to-market regime covering fifty percent of assets would not be likely to eliminate fifty 
percent of the problems associated with the realization requirement.  In fact, as described 
in the next part, it would likely give rise to new problems.  The overall advantages of a 
partial mark-to-market regime are therefore somewhat speculative.  Second, none of 
these approaches explains why the realization requirement should not be eliminated 
altogether through mark-to-market auditing when there is no problem of valuation. 
B. With It: Some Hidden Justifications for Realization 
Most advocates of the realization requirement support it only on a second best 
basis.75  They advance two lines of argument: the costs of the requirement are not as high 
as they seem and the alternative to the realization requirement, a partial mark-to-market 
regime, would introduce new, deeper problems.  Both of these arguments engage in a 
hypothetical cost–benefit analysis in an effort to determine whether a shift from the 
current system to a partial mark-to-market regime is justified.  Much like the arguments 
in favor of a mark-to-market regime, this analysis provides little insight into the policy 
goals the realization requirement may promote.  After discussing these two lines of 
argument, this subpart surveys and evaluates the relatively recent policy argument made 
by David Schizer in favor of realization.76 
The first set of arguments stresses that there are two types of efficiency 
considerations—pre- and post-investment. 77   The realization requirement obviously 
distorts post-investment considerations of whether to engage in a sale or exchange of an 
asset.  However, if imposed uniformly on all assets, it does not necessarily reduce the 
efficiency of pre-investment decisions between different investment opportunities and 
consumption.78  Proponents of the pre-versus-post-investment arguments contend that 
because the realization requirement does not distort pre-investment decisions, the 
problems with it are overstated.79  This analysis has two main weaknesses: it assumes that 
the realization requirement is the only rule that could be broadly applied and that the 
realization requirement's distortion of post-investment decisions is low.  In recent years, 
both assumptions have been called into question.  First, experimentation with partial 
mark-to-market regimes shows that these regimes are administrable and that they could 
thus be systematically and coherently applied.80  Second, the development of new 
                                                      
74 See Schizer, supra note 1, at 1601 (acknowledging that a repeal of realization is not totally un-
administrable). 
75 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 5.  See also Schizer, supra note 1, at 1564–65 (referring to all 
arguments, other than his own, justifying realization). 
76 See infra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
77 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 24–26.  
78  In fact, to the extent the realization requirement provides tax advantages for 
investment, it may also help correct a bias of the income tax for saving and against consumption. 
See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 27.  
79 See Chorvat, supra note 22, at 101–12 (surveying the behavioral economics literature, which 
points out that taxpayers may not take full advantage of the realization requirement's incentives because of 
other non-tax considerations and behavioral attributes).  
80 See I.R.C. §§ 475 (2006), 1256 (West Supp. 2010) (enacted in the 1990s and imposing mark-to-
market taxation on segments of the financial sector). 
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financial instruments has introduced new pressures on the current tax regime by allowing 
aggressive tax planners to push the boundaries of realization-based rules to new 
frontiers.81   
A different, and perhaps stronger, argument emphasizes that realization’s social 
costs may be lower than those of any feasible mark-to-market regime.82  The advantages 
of a full mark-to-market regime would not flow to a partial one, which would remedy 
some problems only at the cost of aggravating others.83  Because no reform proposal 
suggests applying a comprehensive mark-to-market regime,84 taxpayers would have 
obvious incentives to be in one category,85 and complex line-drawing rules would be 
required to reduce manipulation.86  
Another argument for maintaining the requirement contends that most 
individuals do not consider unrealized gains as real.87  According to some research in 
behavioral economics, individuals seem to distinguish between realized (real) and 
unrealized (paper) gains and significantly discount the latter for purposes of evaluating 
their wealth or welfare.88  This process of “mental accounting” goes a long way toward 
explaining the requirement’s endurance. 89   These common perceptions about the 
realization requirement are important in terms of legitimacy and compliance, two crucial 
elements in the current self-reporting regime.90  Yet the popular perception observation 
fails to explain why, and more importantly, how this vague notion of popularity should 
guide policymakers.91  Moreover, since paper gains (and losses) are only discounted and 
not disregarded altogether, mental accounting at best suggests that unrealized gains 
should not be fully taxed—not that they should be completely ignored.  For example, if 
the general public discounts paper gains by 30%, then 70% of the change in value should 
be taxed on a mark-to-market basis. 
To be clear, we do not reject the public perception argument.  As Parts III and IV 
demonstrate, we explain and, to a certain extent, justify it.  Our only point here is that 
simply claiming the public wants a rule provides policymakers with little if any guidance 
as to how to structure good tax policy. 
                                                      
81 These rules allow taxpayers to diversify their risks and cash out their investments without selling 
their assets and realizing the associated gains.  See generally Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the 
Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995) (explaining how financial derivatives allow 
taxpayers to attain certain tax arbitrages). 
82 Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 939. 
83 These new problems would include computation complexity (in the case of retrospective 
taxation); valuation cost for non-traded assets; and, most importantly, vexing line-drawing problems between 
assets taxed only upon realization and those taxed only upon appreciation. 
84 Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 863.  See also infra note 121. 
85 Informed taxpayers would seek to be in the realization category when they had assets with 
unrealized profits (so that they could defer the tax payment) and in the mark-to-market category when they 
had depreciated assets (so that they would be able to deduct their losses without waiting for realization).  The 
difference between realization assets and mark-to-market assets would result in significant inefficiencies 
because it would create huge pre-investment distortions in the allocation of resources.  Zelinsky, supra note 
8, at 915. 
86 Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 904–05.   
87 Chorvat, supra note 22, at 893. 
88 Id. at 77. 
89 Id. at 77; Schenk, supra note 12, at 355–56. 
90 Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 903. 
91 For example, it is not clear to us that public perception would favor a situation in which affluent 
individuals reduced their tax liabilities by realizing losses while borrowing against their appreciated assets.  
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The observation that the realization requirement corresponds with public 
preferences underlies the only recent piece suggesting a policy justification for the 
requirement.  In an insightful article, David Schizer argues that the realization 
requirement should be understood as a politically credible investment subsidy.92  He 
suggests that, by allowing deferral and strategic trading, the realization requirement 
reduces the effective tax on investments.93  It therefore should be viewed as one of many 
tax incentives that Congress uses to promote investment.  Realization is unique among 
these incentives because of its political credibility.  Unlike other subsidies for investment, 
the realization requirement has a relatively stable history,94 has no significant political 
opposition,95 and complements administrative needs of tax authorities.96  Hence, Schizer 
contends that investors perceive this subsidy as credible and stable, and unlike other 
subsidies, it is unlikely to be changed by future legislation.  Since investors see little 
likelihood of realization’s repeal, they are not expected to discount the value of its tax 
benefits.  Despite the imperfections of the realization subsidy,97 the lack of discounting 
by taxpayers makes the subsidy more efficient (from the government’s perspective) in 
achieving the goal of changing taxpayers’ investment behavior.98   
Schizer offers a compelling argument that realization is a subsidy for investment. 
We are, however, skeptical, as to whether the case can be made that realization is a good 
or unique subsidy for investment.  Schizer illustrates his claim that the realization 
requirement is a credible and legitimate subsidy by comparing it to the fluctuating policy 
of lower tax rates on capital gains.  However, this comparison is only one of the many 
possible.  First, it is important to note that the favorable capital gains rate applies only to 
individuals (and not to corporations), while the realization requirement applies to all 
taxpayers.99  There seem to be other equally credible ways of directing a subsidy toward 
individuals—e.g., encouraging pension-saving vehicles, 100  encouraging home equity 
savings through the home interest deduction, and providing certain exemptions for gains 
on the sale of residential homes and closely held small businesses.101  History informs us 
that these targeted saving incentives are credible and stable102 and unlike a broad 
realization requirement, they carry more concrete and narrowly tailored social benefits.  
Furthermore, their costs in terms of regressivity and dead-weight loss may be easier to 
control than those of the realization requirement.  
                                                      
92 Schizer, supra note 1, at 1554 (assuming the political will to use the tax system to tax subsidize 
private investment). 
93 Schizer, supra note 1, at 1552. 
94 Id. at 1580–82.   
95 Id. at 1601–02, 1606–08. 
96 Id. at 1592–95.  
97 Schizer claims that the criticism against realization could be applied against any tax subsidy for 
saving.  Id. at 1574, 1617, 1624. 
98 Id. at 1574.  If the value of the tax benefit were not discounted, the government would have to 
provide less of it to encourage the desired change in investment behavior.  
99 Sections 1(a) and 1(h) of the Internal Revenue Code prescribe different individual tax rates on 
income and on capital gains while I.R.C. § 11 lays a uniform tax rate on all corporate earnings capital. 
100 Charlotte Crane, Honoring Expectations About Taxes: Are Roth IRAs Different?, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, at 2–4 (Nov. 12, 2009),  available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1505120 
(explaining why the pension benefits are typically politically stable).  
101 I.R.C. §§ 121, 163(h) (West Supp. 2010). 
102 Lawrence Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn't: An Actual History and an 
Alternate History, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 82, 88 (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487631 (observing that both the home mortgage and the 
pension saving tax benefits have always been part of the income tax regime in the United States). 
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Second, and more notably, Schizer also overlooks the possibility that a partial 
mark-to-market regime could offer a more credible incentive for investment and risk-
taking because of the way such a tax system would treat losses.103  As mentioned,104 the 
various loss-limitation rules create significant disincentives for risk-taking and 
investment and generate huge compliance costs.105  Even a partial mark-to-market regime 
would make many loss-limitation rules unnecessary because whatever was taxed on a 
mark-to-market basis would take into account all unrealized gains and all unrealized 
losses—so taxpayers would not even have to dispose of an asset to deduct their losses.106  
This fundamental characteristic of mark-to-market taxation is perhaps the most credible 
investment and risk-taking subsidy imaginable.  
C. The Policy Costs of a Theoretical Debate 
The standstill in the debate about the realization requirement—with most 
commentators accepting that it is unjustified but virtually impossible to replace—has 
produced some troubling outcomes.  Tax policy has stagnated as the intellectual 
resources devoted to its development have been channeled almost entirely into preventing 
the abuses made possible by realization.  It would be naïve to expect that every aspect of 
a tax regime would be anchored to an explicit, principled policy objective.  However, 
realization is not just another aspect of the tax regime.  As the above analysis suggests, it 
is the most significant and problematic feature of the current income tax.  The costs 
associated with the inability to link realization to any policy objective cannot, therefore, 
be overstated.   
Within tax scholarship, disagreement over how to accommodate a transactional 
realization requirement has enhanced support for the idea of abandoning the income tax 
altogether.  The notion that the realization requirement is indispensable to an income 
tax, 107  in spite of its serious costs, has prompted calls that favor shifting to a 
consumption–wage tax that would exempt all the income derived from investments and 
savings .108  Such a tax focuses on certain wage-paying and/or consumption transactions 
that are easy to observe and define while completely exempting investment and savings 
from taxation.  Since affluent individuals hold most of the capital assets that would 
become exempt under a consumption–wage tax, such a shift would reduce tax complexity 
                                                      
103 Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 239, 242, 283 (2003) (explaining that by allowing deduction of losses the income tax functions as a 
type of insurance); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 430–
35 (2000) (arguing that loss limitation rules are more likely to have a regressive impact because taxpayers 
with less diversified portfolios and without tax advice will tend to suffer capital losses without being able to 
offset them); David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1 (2004); Lawrence Zelenak, 
The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 
879, 891–95 (2006). 
104 Land, supra note 29, and accompanying text. 
105 See Ilan Benshalom, supra note 39 (discussing what comprises an optimal allocation of public 
goods); Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 
427–31, 437–39 (1952);Land, supra note 29, at 51; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 4. 
106 Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal 
Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1435–44 (2004). 
107 David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in 
the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731, 769 (1995); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a 
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1314–15 (2001). 
108 Andrews, supra note 7, at 1115–16.  See generally Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 789-
91 (supporting Dan Shaviro’s arguments in favor of the consumption tax). 
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at the expense of reducing its progressivity.109  Because of the realization requirement, 
the current tax regime’s treatment of investment returns is arbitrary.110  Thus, shifting to a 
consumption tax would actually sacrifice very little in terms of progressivity. 
In the United States today, and in the developed world more generally,111 the 
notion of tax progressivity has strong policy justifications and garners considerable 
political support.112  If tax progressivity is a worthy goal, then the consumption tax is an 
undesirable answer to the predicament of realization.113  Instead of throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater, it is time to critically reconsider the role of the realization 
requirement in contemporary income tax policy and theory. 
III. A NORMATIVE DEFENSE FOR REALIZATION—PROMOTING INCOME 
TAX PROGRESSIVITY 
This article advances the notion that realization is tied to the progressivity of the 
income tax base and can therefore be seen as part of a broader attempt to promote wealth 
redistribution.  It approaches the normative arguments for realization by asking what 
should happen if policymakers could accurately and costlessly observe the market price 
of all assets.  That is, if valuation were no obstacle, would we want to subject all assets to 
mark-to-market taxation and, if not, why? The main argument is that while errors will 
occur under any system, not all errors are equal.  If a primary goal of the system is 
redistribution, we should consider the distributive impact of different types of errors.   
The first subpart explains the fundamental relationship between tax policy and 
redistribution.  The second subpart argues that the realization requirement is normatively 
justified, but only with respect to certain emotionally non-fungible (personal) assets.  
Personal assets are broadly defined as assets for which the market price provides an 
inconsistent indication of the value taxpayers assign to them.  With respect to these 
assets, the market price offers but a poor proxy for well-being and therefore should not be 
used by the tax regime for interpersonal comparisons.  The third subpart asks what course 
of action policymakers should take knowing the high likelihood of error in measuring 
economic well-being by the market price of personal assets.  It suggests that 
policymakers committed to income tax progressivity may choose to tax personal assets 
only upon realization.  This analysis acknowledges that the taxation of personal assets 
only upon realization should be seen as a tax benefit.  However, we argue that unlike 
most tax benefits, this benefit is relatively progressive in nature, favoring primarily the 
middle (rather than the upper) class.  This is because personal assets comprise a 
disproportionately high percentage of less affluent taxpayers’ assets but a considerably 
smaller percentage of affluent individuals’ assets.114  The fourth subpart replies to the 
                                                      
109 Advocates of the consumption tax recognize that exempting the yields for saving and investment 
would have a somewhat regressive impact but argue that all distributional and revenue effects of the 
exemption could be corrected through higher marginal tax rates.  Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 
791–94.  The notion that a consumption tax system could be completely revenue and distributionally neutral 
has been convincingly challenged.  Daniel Halperin, Concluding Comment, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME, 
supra note 70, at 309, 310–11; Sanchirico, supra note 6. 
110 See analysis supra Part I.A. 
111 See infra note 162.  
112 See infra notes 156–163 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 167–170 and accompanying text.  
114 Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling Tide: Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the US, 1989–
2001, in INT’L PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSEHOLD WEALTH 19, 53–54 (Edward N. Wolff ed., 2006) (showing the 
distribution of assets by personal wealth in 2001: while personal assets consisted of 78% of total assets held 
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major potential criticisms of our approach.  It argues that making the income tax base 
more progressive by applying the realization requirement to personal assets has some 
significant advantages over other means of promoting tax progressivity. 
A.  Tax and Redistribution: At the Crossroads of Philosophy and Public 
Finance 
It is necessary to clarify the scope of this article because questions of redistribution 
involve complicated notions of philosophy and public finance.  Any type of redistributive 
regime is based on two fundamental policy decisions: what should be distributed and how 
it should be measured by the tax regime.  The two are obviously related, with the latter 
becoming virtually impossible to directly address when the currency of justice (i.e., what 
should be distributed) is intangible and difficult to observe (e.g., utility).  Hence, 
policymakers have to rely on proxies rather than try to measure the currency of justice 
directly.115 
Unsurprisingly, there is strong disagreement among scholars about the proper 
distributive justice benchmark for measuring and remedying disadvantages.  Political 
philosophers have suggested a number of such “currencies” through which well-being 
should be measured, including opportunities,116 primary goods,117 and capabilities.118  
Even though this article cannot resolve this question, it adopts the terminology of the 
literature that focuses on the distribution of welfare as a subjective measurement of well-
being.119  It does so because the welfarist terminology is consistent with most of the tax 
literature.120   
When policymakers wish to formulate an effective distributive scheme, there is an 
obvious mismatch between what they seek to redistribute (e.g., welfare) and what they 
are actually measuring, taxing, and distributing (e.g., income).  Hence, the current income 
tax regime is a result of the difficulty of directly observing how much economic well-
being (e.g., in terms of welfare) individuals have and of the belief that income is 
considered a good proxy for economic well-being.  
                                                                                                                                                 
by households in the bottom half of the wealth distribution, they comprised only about 10% of the total 
wealth of the top 1% of households).   
115 Daniel N. Shaviro, Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment, 53 TAX L. REV. 397, 398–403 (2000). 
116 See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (providing leading article on equality of resources). 
117 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54 (1999) (arguing that justice requires equal 
distribution of primary goods such as rights, liberties, income, and wealth). 
118 For the leading texts on capabilities, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF 
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 
(1999). 
119 Welfarism evaluates social choices solely according to how they affect the well-being of 
society’s members.  Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and 
Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 282 (2006).  In contrast to utilitarianism, welfarism may take 
into account inequality of well-being across individuals.  Id. at 296–97.  Like utilitarianism, it focuses on 
individual utility/welfare as a measurement of well-being and does not take into consideration concepts of 
“rights” or “fairness.”  Id. at 282.   
120  Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 119, at 282–83; Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax Versus the 
Consumption Tax and the Tax Treatment of Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 35, 39 (1995); Shaviro, supra 
note 115, at 398–403; David A Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
NETWORK 9, 43–44 (Aug. 23, 2007),  http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008985.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
stress that this article’s analysis is not limited to the redistribution of welfare and could be extended to other 
objective egalitarian benchmarks. 
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This article considers whether the market prices of different assets are good proxies 
for economic well-being.  From a philosophical perspective, it is clear that there can be 
many cases in which the objective market price may not provide a good indicator for a 
subjective benchmark such as welfare.  In these cases, relying on assets’ market prices for 
tax purposes becomes problematic because it leads to redistributive errors.   
This article’s analysis adopts a public finance, rather than a philosophical, approach 
to this problem.  It assumes that if large-scale redistribution is warranted, making some 
type of assessment of individuals’ well-being is inevitable.  It also acknowledges that 
market price is policymakers’ main source of information, so that some errors are 
inevitable as well.  We then identify categories of assets for which one could expect to 
find a significant mismatch between market price and what the tax system is aiming to 
redistribute.  In other words, this article considers when market price is not an adequate 
proxy for well-being (and other potential currencies of justice) and evaluates the 
implications of that mismatch for the realization requirement.  
B. Market Price, Personal Assets, and Interpersonal Comparisons 
This subpart advances the claim that the realization requirement is normatively 
justified with respect to certain types of personal assets.  For those assets, the market 
price may be an inherently inaccurate proxy for value and therefore should not be relied 
upon from a tax perspective. 
The analysis begins with the observation that there is one point upon which 
everyone seems to agree: personal assets could not be taxed on a mark-to-market basis 
under any politically feasible tax regime.121  In many cases personal assets may be 
difficult to value—e.g., old family furniture, real estate in places with low exchange 
activity.  However, many personal assets are very easy to value—for example, real estate 
in certain cities, old cars, horses in the family stables, certain collectable items (e.g., 
stamp collections). The intuitive case against taxing these assets on a mark-to-market 
basis derives from the notion that market price may not adequately reflect their true value 
to taxpayers.   
Advocates of shifting to a mark-to-market regime focus on publicly traded 
instruments, arguing that exceptions could be made for hard-to-value personal assets. 
Advocates of the realization requirement stress that valuation and liquidity concerns 
would make it difficult to tax closely held companies, certain farms, and real estate under 
a mark-to-market regime.  
This article takes a different approach and questions what makes the mark-to-
market taxation of certain assets so unappealing and asks if the answer helps explain the 
normative base of the realization requirement.  This type of inquiry may help 
policymakers start succeeding in what they so far have failed in doing—promoting 
consistent general rules for applying the realization requirement.  
There are only two pieces that touch upon the above inquiry.  The first is by 
Louis Kaplow, who examined how human capital would be taxed under an ideal income 
tax, which would include a tax on unrealized earnings.122  Kaplow did not make this 
                                                      
121 Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 9, at 801–02; Fellows, supra note 1, at 781; Halperin, supra 
note 9, at 503; Schenk, supra note 12, at 364; Shakow, supra note 9, at 1144, 1153–54, 1158–60; Shaviro, 
supra note 1, at 7; Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 876, 889.  
122 Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994) 
[hereinafter Kaplow, Ideal Income Tax].  See also Louis Kaplow, On the Divergence Between “Ideal” And 
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inquiry to determine whether there is something unique about human capital that justifies 
applying the realization requirement to it.  Instead, he argued that those advocating for a 
shift to an ideal income tax, which like a mark-to-market regime would tax changes in 
value, should account for how human capital would be treated under such a regime.  In 
his opinion, if human capital received special realization-based treatment, 123  the 
advocates for the mark-to-market regime would have the burden of explaining why.124  
Some commentators have read Kaplow’s argument not as an inquiry into whether the 
realization requirement is justified but more as a question as to whether an income tax 
should be imposed on capital assets.125  
The second is a recent article by the authors of this article that deals with the 
taxation of earning capacity as a point of intersection between public finance and political 
philosophy theories.126  That article suggests that the market price for earning-capacity 
endowment is not an adequate benchmark for a tax-transfer regime.  Earning capacity 
should not be perceived as a cash asset that individuals can simply use, because the 
decision of how to work is multilayered and also driven by preferences, moral 
convictions, and needs.  In essence, we argued that the market value of earning capacity 
was insufficient as a normative foundation for the tax-transfer regime.  
In this article we expand upon that preliminary analysis to determine how it can 
advance tax policy with respect to the realization principle in general.  We agree with 
Kaplow that a pure mark-to-market income tax regime would require taxing the value 
fluctuation of all assets, including human capital.127  We also agree with him that a 
rigorous mark-to-market regime would include other types of assets, such as personal 
belongings, residential homes, and family businesses.  We broadly classify personal 
assets as assets in which there is a high probability that taxpayers’ subjective value is 
radically different (that is, significantly higher)128 than the assets’ market value.129  The 
higher personal value attached to these assets is prohibitive—that is, it renders the 
possibility of trading them on the market very unlikely.  Even though it is impossible to 
comprehensively define emotionally non-fungible assets, one can think of them as assets 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conventional Income-Tax Treatment of Human Capital, 86 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 347 
(1996).  
123 Kaplow, Ideal Income Tax, supra note 122, at 1512–14 (arguing that this is a consumption tax 
treatment).  For a different view, see Benshalom & Stead, supra note 15, at 1542–49.   
124 Kaplow, supra note 120, at 36–37 (clarifying what his objectives were after claiming that they 
were misunderstood). 
125 Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human 
Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 5 (1995); Kaplow, supra note 120, at 38–39 (firmly disclaiming Zelenak’s view). 
126 Benshalom & Stead, supra note 15, at 1527–29. 
127 Kaplow, Ideal Income Tax, supra note 122, at 1504. 
128 It is important to note that the revealed preference of owners is that they value all of their assets 
(not just their personal assets) as worth more than the market price—since otherwise they would sell them.  
For this reason we define personal assets as those assets were there is a high probability that the subjective 
value is significantly higher than the market value. 
129 Some may find this argument similar to a line of property law literature developed by Margaret 
Radin, which claims that personal assets constitute part of individual personhood.  See Margaret J. Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982).  However, we think that this article’s argument 
is different and easier to accept.  Rather than arguing that personal assets are inherently different, we merely 
observe that people attach different values to them so that the trading costs (or the costs of detachment) with 
respect to these assets are often very high.  While there seems to be strong recognition that these costs exist, 
there is some literature suggesting that they are often given excessive weight.  See Stephanie M. Stern, 
Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1110–24 (2009) 
(making such an argument with respect to residential homes). 
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of personal use or those that involve significant human capital contributions of the 
taxpayer or of his relatives.130  This definition is somewhat crude and overinclusive, since 
not every asset that comprises private consumption or has human capital embedded in it 
has prohibitive personal trading costs.  For example, the New York Times is a publicly 
traded company, yet it is controlled by the Ochs-Sulzberger family.  Should the shares of 
the family be considered personal while all other shares are non-personal?  Should all 
members of the family be considered as involved with the corporation or only those that 
have invested their human capital?  This issue is of crucial importance, since much of the 
wealth owned by affluent taxpayers is in the form of equity investment in closely held 
businesses, which arguably could be considered personal assets.131  
The above questions are indeed vexing, but we believe that a more precise 
definition is not necessary at this stage.  As we discuss in Part IV, with a few refinements, 
the broad definition we provide for personal assets suffices for the purposes of promoting 
real-world reform recommendations.132  Hence, to develop the normative argument, this 
part assumes it is possible to distinguish between emotionally non-fungible (personal) 
assets and other assets.  While the task of translating this argument and its conclusions to 
concrete policy measures is taken up in detail only in Part IV, it is worthwhile to note a 
few of our conclusions to assure the skeptical reader of the practical value of our 
argument.  First, investment assets, which are already defined in the code for many 
purposes, and are (almost by definition) non-personal, could be taxed on a mark-to-
market basis.  This partial shift to a mark-to-market regime would be a significant and 
administrable reform, which would not require a full definition of personal assets.  
Second, to accommodate revenue, distributional considerations, and concerns over tax 
avoidance, we suggest that tax authorities cap the amount of personal assets that should 
be taxed only upon realization at a certain fair market value.133 
Our analysis departs from the notion that even though there are significant 
differences from person-to-person as to what assets are emotionally non-fungible, there 
are categories of assets whose values are very unlikely to have such idiosyncratic 
psychological components (e.g., publicly traded assets held by portfolio investors).134  
Similarly, there are broad categories of items—such as inherited family jewelry, homes, 
and self-created artwork—for which we can reasonably assume a substantial gap between 
taxpayers’ subjective value and the market price.  With respect to these emotionally non-
fungible personal assets, the existence of this value gap can be assumed with relatively 
great certainty, but the size of this gap varies heterogeneously and is not observable.  
While many people may view their grandmother’s wedding veil as a precious heirloom, 
only few would consider it priceless, most would be willing to sell it eventually if offered 
enough money, and some would sell it immediately for the highest bid a Craigslist post 
could drum up.  Any attempt to base tax treatment on the market value of these assets 
would carry a serious risk of error.  
An example may help to show why the market price is a poor indication of the 
value of personal assets.  Imagine two individuals, both of whom value their kidneys, 
                                                      
130 The tax code employs a somewhat similar definition of which relatives count as related parties 
and accordingly employs special rules for transactions between them.  See I.R.C. § 267 (West Supp. 2010). 
131 See Kennickel, supra note 114, at 53–55.  See also infra Appendix. 
132 See infra notes 185–199 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 205–206. 
134 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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family homes, and employment as law professors as priceless.135  The market, however, 
values the kidney of one professor as worthless (not because she is not healthy but simply 
because there are very few, mostly poor people who could receive a transplant from her) 
and the other’s as worth one million dollars (again not because she is particularly healthy 
but because she happens to have a kidney that is in high demand by Silicon Valley 
CEOs).  In the same manner, the market assesses a negative value to one’s home 
(because a correctional facility is being built nearby) and a value of one million dollars to 
the other’s home (because a new technological park is being built fifteen minutes away).  
Furthermore, their human capital is priced dramatically differently by the market: while 
the former has the skills to be a successful human and labor rights lawyer, earning close 
to minimum wage, the other possesses the capacity to be a generously compensated tax 
planner to high net worth individuals.  While the well-being of these two individuals 
seems to be rather similar, their tax liabilities under a full mark-to-market tax regime 
would be radically different because the personal assets they own, which neither of them 
intends to put on the market, are quite differently priced.  Most people would probably 
consider this type of interpersonal comparison arbitrary and unreasonable for tax 
purposes, because the essence of the price signal is what others will pay for assets if they 
were put on the market.  
In contrast, the market price would offer a valid proxy for well-being if each of 
the professors chose to sell these personal assets.  When the professors choose to sell 
their family homes, they signal that they accept that the market valuation of the properties 
is greater or equal to the subjective values they assign to them.  This acceptance of the 
market equilibrium validates the market price as a good proxy for their economic well-
being, and this validation makes it a relevant benchmark for tax redistribution.  This 
analysis does not mean to suggest that, with respect to all personal assets, a voluntary 
transaction is always an indicator of well-being.136  On aggregate, however, the market 
return for the actual use or sale of personal assets offers a good proxy for economic well-
being, which is not the case when the market price is hypothetical. 
For tax purposes, it is difficult to draw a meaningful interpersonal comparison of 
well-being by focusing only on the market value of personal assets.  In the context of 
these assets, the market value offers only a poor proxy for individual well-being because 
the subjective value of how to use these personal assets is determined by a complicated 
metric.  In contrast, market pricing is a one-dimensional process that aggregates the 
maximum cash flow a certain asset could be expected to yield if put on the market.  
Simply put, the market values of assets such as our human capital are poor indicators of 
our well-being and therefore should not be used by the tax system for interpersonal 
comparisons.  
                                                      
135 Since for many economically oriented readers the term “priceless” would seem naïve or 
hypocritical, one can assume for the purposes of this article that priceless equals “anything around 5 million 
dollars.” 
136 For example, one can assume that if the professors did sell their kidneys they would do so out of 
dire need—so that any market return on this sale would likely fall short of being a reliable proxy for their 
economic well-being.  This claim is valid, and as we discuss in the next subpart, there may be times in which 
certain assets should be exempt altogether rather than taxed upon realization.  However, such exceptions 
leave the main premise unshaken. 
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Welfare, as mentioned, is not the only possible currency of justice,137 and some 
important theories indeed rely on more objective measurements of economic well-
being.138  Our example assumes that both professors derive similar welfare from their 
personal assets, but this assumption is not necessary.  One can reasonably argue that both 
professors are similarly positioned, in objective terms, regardless of how they value their 
personal assets.  Each of them has a primary residence that she was able to choose, a job 
that allows her to meet her financial objectives and promote her intellectual interests, and 
a healthy body.  To accept our analysis, one has only to accept that the market price does 
not capture all of the objective value associated with certain assets—not that 
redistribution of welfare is the only benchmark of equality.  Put differently, if one agrees 
that both professors are similarly situated in objective terms, then the conclusion must 
follow that the market price is an objective measure of their economic ability but not 
necessarily the only or the best objective measurement policymakers can or should 
employ to determine that ability.139   
To be clear on this point, the market price is a social construct and therefore not 
“correct” when it assesses Google stock or “wrong” when evaluating more personal 
assets.  The difference is not that Google stock has a price and personal assets are 
“beyond pricing.”140  Instead, the claim is that the tax authorities’ ability to make 
meaningful interpersonal comparisons is much greater when considering the price of 
Google stock than it is for the market price of personal assets.  Individuals may invest in 
Google stock for a number of different reasons—speculation, risk-diversification, or 
belief in the company’s corporate values.  However, for most shareholders, Google 
shares are primarily investment assets—and as such are not very different from money 
because they primarily represent consumption power.141 
Investment assets, of course, are not the only type of assets that could be valued 
independently from the decision to use them.  Money, for example, is in most cases 
simply a piece of paper that enumerates fungible and homogeneous units that represent 
individuals’ comparative abilities to participate in market exchanges.  It is very unlikely 
that certain individuals would attach special immeasurable utilities to homogeneous and 
                                                      
137 See Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International 
Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34–36 (2010) (providing a brief review of the distributive justice 
literature). 
138 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text. 
139 One can say that, even in objective terms, the market does not always adequately reflect the 
value of certain assets—such as shelter and food security, or mobility.  One can further accept that tax 
authorities have difficulties observing whether individuals attach these values to assets and, more importantly 
determining the relative “price” of these values.  See generally SEN, supra note 118 (providing a set of non-
money-equivalent goods that are required for individuals to establish worthwhile lives).  
140 The beyond pricing argument is typically identified with the non-commodification critique.  The 
core of the argument presented in the non-commodification literature is that for some things (such as human 
organs or sex) voluntary market exchanges are inappropriate because they are dehumanizing, are never really 
voluntary, and/or have significant negative externalities.  See Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 7-9 (Apr. 21, 2009) 
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MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (providing one of the key texts on this topic).  We 
believe that our argument has little to do with this literature, the core of which argues that certain things 
should not be on the market.  This article emphasizes the difficulties of making interpersonal comparisons 
with regard to some emotionally non-fungible assets, many of which could be put on the market without 
incident or outcry.  
141 See Radin, supra note 129, at 959–60 (providing a somewhat similar argument that personal 
property is not replaceable). 
68 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:43 
fungible cash assets.142  Accordingly, the market assessment of the worth of monetary 
assets seems valid when making interpersonal comparisons of individuals’ well-being for 
tax purposes.  Money and human organs lie on two ends of the continuum—everything 
else falls in between.  When an asset is closer to the money side of the continuum, it is 
easier to see how its market value can serve as a proxy for well-being.  It is therefore 
reasonable to assign tax liability for that asset’s fluctuation in value according to a mark-
to-market regime.  The assignment of mark-to-market tax liability seems less justifiable 
for assets closer to the personal asset end of the continuum.  There may be a lot of very 
difficult cases in between, but it is possible to envision some preliminary classification 
rules.  Primary residences could be categorically treated as personal assets as could small 
family businesses, which are likely to embody a great deal of psychological value and 
non-diversified risk taking.  Other categories of emotionally non-fungible assets may 
include assets employed in active trade or businesses with respect to which taxpayers 
invest a considerable amount of their time.  In contrast, portfolio holdings in publicly 
traded corporations and other entities with a large number of owners are generally 
emotionally fungible.  These types of distinctions may seem too vague and impractical at 
first, but, as we discuss later, they align well with various distinctions on which the 
current tax regime already relies.143 
No liberal egalitarian regime aspiring to engage in redistribution can avoid 
interpersonal comparisons.  That interpersonal comparisons are unavoidable, however, 
does not mean that all interpersonal comparisons are alike.  In Part I.A, we discussed why 
it is problematic for an income tax regime to base tax assessments upon interpersonal 
comparisons made only with respect to realized gains.  In this subpart we modify this 
observation by arguing that, when it comes to personal assets, the market price of an 
unrealized asset is not a good indicator of well-being.  In this respect, it is worth 
emphasizing the following points.  First, taxpayers can attach higher (subjective) value to 
all assets—and not necessarily just to personal assets.  However, from a public finance 
perspective, the important thing is that gaps between subjective and market value are 
more likely to occur with respect to personal assets.  
Second, if subjective value is unobservable, policymakers cannot know how 
heterogeneous it is.144  So if two taxpayers own residential homes with the same market 
price, tax authorities will be unable to distinguish between the taxpayer who values her 
home as priceless and the taxpayer who values his home at $1,000 over the market price. 
Hence, with respect to personal assets that are likely to have higher subjective than 
market values, tax policymakers operate in a scenario of extreme uncertainty. 
Third, some commentators may argue that since all assets will eventually be 
taxed on their market price, the difference between a mark-to-market and a realization-
based income tax regime is merely one of timing.145  Hence, if policymakers tax all 
personal assets on a mark-to-market basis, the only difference between this regime and a 
realization-based regime would be that the former would eliminate the arbitrary 
advantage of deferral.  This objection overlooks that many (and maybe even most) 
personal assets would never be realized.  A great many personal assets, from family 
                                                      
142 Experimental behavioral economics suggests that people do not attach special value for assets 
held primarily for exchange purposes.  See Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 THE J. OF POLITICAL ECO. 1325, 1328 (1990). 
143 See infra notes 187–191. 
144 This comment is relevant only to well-being and not to more objective “currencies” of justice. 
145 We wish to thank Jacob Nussim for bringing this forceful argument to our attention. 
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farms to jewelry, are often transferred by gift or bequest.  Hence, the market is not the 
ultimate appraiser of many unrealized personal assets, which leaves policymakers with 
the difficulties associated with the unobservable varied subjective values attached to 
those assets. 
Finally, we do not wish to deny that fluctuation in personal assets’ market values 
provides some relevant information about individuals' economic well-being.  Recall the 
example of the two professors.  It is difficult to deny that the professor with the more 
valuable home and higher earning capacity is at least in some ways better off than her 
peer.146  We argue, however, that more information is not necessarily better if it affects 
policymakers’ tax decisions in a way that does not seem to correspond with what the tax 
system is trying to achieve.   
The relevant tax policy inquiry, therefore, is neither whether the market value of 
personal assets is equivalent to well-being (it obviously is not) nor whether it is a proxy 
for well-being (it obviously is).  The relevant question is whether market value is a good 
proxy for well-being—and this subpart has established why the proxy value of the market 
price is poor with respect to emotionally non-fungible assets.   
If the realization principle is justified only with respect to personal assets, it 
follows that this normative constraint does not apply, or applies with much less force, 
with respect to other assets.  The upshot of this analysis is that if policymakers consider 
income to be a good benchmark for redistributive taxation, then there may be a case for 
adopting a hybrid mark-to-market-realization tax regime.  This regime would tax certain 
assets, namely investment assets, under a mark-to-market system while taxing personal 
assets on a realization basis.  The next subpart argues that in the context of such a regime, 
the realization requirement offers a reasonable policy tool to assure the progressivity of 
the income tax base.  Part IV explains the fundamental attributes of such a hybrid income 
tax regime and suggests a realistic proposal for reform that offers improvements over the 
current realization-based regime in terms of complexity, equity, and revenue. 
C. Realization as a Progressively Distributed Tax Benefit 
This subpart establishes why a hybrid tax regime that taxes personal assets on a 
realization basis and other (namely, investment) assets on a mark-to-market basis would 
help promote a more progressive redistribution of income in society.  The key point is 
that personal assets represent a larger portion of the wealth of low and (especially) 
medium-income taxpayers than of the wealthy.147  Put differently, such a regime would 
promote progressivity because investment assets, which categorically are not personal 
assets, are disproportionally held by affluent taxpayers.  Therefore, providing a tax 
benefit to personal assets, and not to other assets, would make the tax system as a whole 
more progressive.  This claim should be integrated with the claim of the above subpart 
rather than understood as free standing.  Having a progressive income tax does not 
require giving realization-based treatment to personal assets.  However, given the 
difficulty of using the market value of personal assets as a proxy for well-being, taxing 
only those assets upon realization should be viewed as a progressive move.  If confined to 
personal assets, the realization treatment would still be a tax benefit and would continue 
to cause some distortions and inequities.  However, given that personal assets comprise a 
much greater component of non-affluent individuals’ resources, it would be, overall, a 
                                                      
146 Most notably, the professor with the more valuable assets can offer them as collateral to 
creditors and borrow at a lower interest rate or rely on them in cases of emergency. 
147 See Kennickel, supra note 114, at 53–55.  See also infra Appendix.   
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progressively distributed tax benefit.  This subpart only argues that limiting the 
application of the realization requirement to personal assets makes the tax base more 
progressive.  The more complicated task of discussing why tax progressivity is 
warranted, and whether taxing personal assets only upon realization comprises a sound 
policy to achieve progressivity, is left for the next subpart. 
At the outset it is clear that even though personal assets are not unique to less 
affluent taxpayers, they comprise a much larger proportion of those taxpayers’ wealth.  
For example, in a pure mark-to-market system both Joe Six Pack and Bill Gates would be 
taxed on the change in market value of their identical golden wedding rings.  Assume that 
Gates values his ring at $500,000, Joe values his at $5,000, and each ring has a market 
value of $500.  The strength of the mark-to-market approach is that it avoids inquiries 
about subjective value and focuses solely on the market price as an objective and value 
free way to measure economic ability.  
The important point, however, is that even if both rings were identical, 
exempting them from mark-to-market treatment would not result in a distributional wash.  
The truth is that Gates’s ring represents a much smaller percentage of his overall wealth 
than Joe’s ring does for him.  Hence, in a revenue-neutral setting, where taxes forgone 
have to be raised somewhere else within the system, granting a tax benefit to wedding 
rings so that both would be taxed only upon realization would increase Gates’s effective 
tax burden.  If the government wants to maintain a constant level of spending without 
adding new taxes, and is not able to tax wedding rings and other personal assets that both 
Joe and Gates have, it would have to increase tax rates on other types of assets—namely 
investment assets—that only Gates has.148  
The costs of detachment from one’s personal assets are not unique to wedding 
rings.  For example, if instead of a wedding ring one thinks about identical baseball card 
collections, gold watches, or old family farms, one will get to precisely the same intuitive 
results.  High detachment costs characterize basically all types of personal assets 
including human capital, homes, and small family businesses.  A tax professor values his 
job partly because he values the freedom and flexibility that many tax planners do not 
have.  Many elderly people do not wish to move to different apartments or retirement 
homes because leaving their homes is emotionally costly to them.  From a neo-classical 
economic perspective, these costs represent (some out of many) common factors that 
impact the supply curve. 
In terms of progressivity, the example of humble golden wedding rings is not 
very representative.  The case for the progressivity of applying the realization 
requirement to personal assets may be much more complicated with respect to other types 
of assets—e.g., human capital, family farms, residential real estate.  Generally, wealthy 
taxpayers tend to have a higher number of (more valuable) personal assets than poor and 
middle-class taxpayers.  Hence, the progressivity tax benefit is questionable, since much 
of it would not be directed towards the lower economic quintile of society.  Middle class 
individuals have much of their wealth concentrated in home equity, private closely held 
businesses, and human capital.  Allowing all or some of these assets to be taxed only 
                                                      
148 A more formal explanation would stress the following.  Income (I) could be defined as the net 
consumption (C) and savings/investment (S) in a given period of time.  Therefore, if  I=ΔC+ΔS, an income 
tax regime that provided a tax benefit for private consumption would shift the burden to savings and 
investment, and an income tax that provided a tax benefit to savings and investment would shift the tax 
burden to consumed income.  
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upon realization would provide a tax benefit that is less progressive than what Gates’s 
and Joe’s wedding bands may suggest. 
The above observation is evidently true, but it fails to capture the core of the 
argument presented.  First, when discussing income tax progressivity, it is important to 
bear in mind that low-income taxpayers play a relatively minor part in this debate. 
Personal exemptions, tax credits, and low marginal tax rates mean that low-income 
taxpayers pay little or no taxes.149  Even though assessing what people have may also be 
important for transfer purposes,150 when it comes to taxes, the question of allocating the 
tax burden is primarily a tradeoff between the middle class (whose wealth is primarily in 
the form of human capital and other personal assets) and the upper class (who also have 
significant amount of investment assets).  
Second, policymakers should question whether, given the difficulty of taxing 
personal assets on a mark-to-market basis, the advantages of a mark-to-market regime 
should be abandoned altogether.  More specifically, they should inquire whether there are 
reasonable ways to achieve the distributional advantages of the mark-to-market regime 
without subjecting personal assets to it.  If savings and investment assets were taxed on a 
mark-to-market basis, the effective tax rate on them would rise.  Therefore, the option of 
subjecting these assets to mark-to-market taxation promotes a relatively progressive 
alternative to the current regime.  
Indeed, under our proposal the realization treatment of personal assets would 
continue to benefit the middle class, but by the same token, mark-to-market taxation of 
investment assets would increase the tax burden on wealthy individuals.151  Such a mark-
to-market regime would eliminate the benefits of tax planning, strategic trading, and 
deferral opportunities with respect to capital assets.  It would therefore result in a higher 
effective tax rate on investment assets (if tax rates on them remain the same as on 
personal assets) as well as more transparent, equitable, and efficient taxation of such 
assets.  Implementing this type of selective realization requirement for personal assets 
would position the income tax more as an elite tax—a notion that is not in any way 
new.152  
By exploring the unique case of certain personal assets, we argue that not all 
errors are distributionally equal and that policymakers should take errors other than 
incorrect market valuations into account.  Tax systems rely on market valuation because 
it is a proxy for economic well-being.  However, in certain cases the market price offers 
only a weak proxy, so relying on it is an error in itself.  By highlighting the different 
                                                      
149 See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 
112 YALE L.J. 261, 270 fig.5 (2002). 
150 The relationship between measurement of economic ability for transfer and tax purposes is not 
always the same.  See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 535 (1995) (suggesting there may be serious disadvantages to using 
the same measurement of economic well-being for tax and transfer purposes); Benshalom & Stead, supra 
note 15, at 1530–31; Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1179–80 (2006). 
151 As mentioned, savings and capital accumulation are characteristics of the upper quintile of 
society.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
152 Prior to World War II, the vast majority of the middle class was exempt from the income tax 
altogether.  See generally Carolyn Jones, Class Tax to a Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion 
of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989) (explaining the dynamic of making the 
income tax to a mass tax).  Lately, there have been some calls to re-establish the income tax as an elite tax 
while introducing a federal consumption tax to replace the income tax revenues from the middle class.  See 
Graetz, supra note 149, at 281–99. 
72 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:43 
distributional impact of various types of errors, this article hopes to add a new analytic 
consideration to the discussion of realization.  
This argument deviates from traditional tax analysis, which associates base 
progressivity with a broad and comprehensive base—one that employs few exceptions 
and exemptions.153  The ability of the income tax base to promote wealth redistribution is 
a combination of two major factors: the tax base (what is taxed) and the rate structure 
(how much is taxed).  Any income tax regime can make a change in one of these factors 
and remain distributionally neutral if it modifies the other factor.  For example, if the top 
marginal tax rates are increased for households earning more than $250,000 a year, the 
income tax would become more progressive unless the tax base were adjusted.  This 
adjustment could take a number of forms—exempting certain types of savings (e.g., 
college savings) or providing benefits to certain consumption activities (e.g., new, hybrid 
cars) that affluent households are more likely to engage in.  In this respect, this article 
offers an intellectual supplement to the traditional perception of tax base progressivity.  
Rather than arguing for a comprehensive benefit-free tax base, it contends that a 
progressive tax base could be attained by endorsing a tax benefit that is progressively 
allocated.  This is precisely what we have argued with respect to applying the realization 
requirement only to personal assets.  Such a deviation from a pure mark-to-market 
income tax regime would make the tax base more progressive because the tax benefit 
would be allocated to the owners of personal assets— assets that represent a larger 
portion of the wealth of less affluent individuals than of the rich. 
As mentioned, taxing individuals according to their economic well-being requires 
certain interpersonal comparisons, which may be inherently inaccurate.154  However, not 
all tax assessment inaccuracies are created equal.  This article introduces this insight to 
the realization-mistake literature, showing that the costs of certain realization 
inaccuracies may disproportionally fall on low and medium-income taxpayers in a way 
that undermines the notion of tax progressivity.  
D. Advantages and Limitations of the Proposal 
A few lines of criticism may be deployed against this argument.  First, on a very 
basic level, some may contend that the income tax regime should not promote values of 
progressivity and wealth redistribution among taxpayers.  Second, even for those who 
accept that tax progressivity is a worthy policy goal, there is still a question of whether 
the tax system should become more progressive.  Third, it is not clear that granting a 
realization tax benefit to personal assets is the best way to promote tax progressivity.  The 
realization requirement features some fundamental arbitrariness, so embracing it makes 
redistribution inherently inaccurate.  Similarly, other mechanisms (e.g., allowing higher 
personal exemptions or employing higher marginal tax rates) could prove to be as 
effective.  Fourth, if personal assets are held in a progressive manner, there is the 
question of why their taxation should be deferred by the realization principle rather than 
completely exempt or simply taxed at lower rates.  
In capsule form, our answers to these criticisms are that with respect to the first 
and second lines of criticism, we point out that while the desirability of tax redistribution 
goes beyond the scope of this paper, there is strong theoretical and popular support for a 
                                                      
153 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 4; Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 720–26 
(1970). 
154 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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certain level of tax progressivity.  The third and fourth potential criticisms question 
whether this article’s proposal is the proper way to structure income tax progressivity to 
effectively promote redistributive objectives.  The reply to these questions stresses one 
core idea.  This article does not try to propose the adoption of a theoretically clean yet 
impractical model.  Instead, it seeks to suggest how tax policymakers can try to improve 
the current redistributive tax arrangements in the messy reality in which they operate.  In 
this context, applying the realization requirement to personal assets is a realistic measure 
that reasonably balances distributional objectives with efficiency, revenue, and tax 
administration concerns.  
The first line of criticism highlights two different questions inherent in the debate 
over tax progressivity: whether wealth redistribution is a desired objective and whether 
the tax system is the proper way to promote redistribution.  These questions are 
extremely broad, so this article can merely point to the relevant political philosophy and 
tax theories addressing them.  Most contemporary liberal political theories are explicitly 
egalitarian to some degree.155  This means that they do not categorically accept the 
fairness of the distribution of assets by the market and that they justify coercive state 
action to attain wealth redistribution.  Progressive wealth distribution is typically not a 
goal in itself, but only a proxy for meeting a distribution of something more fundamental 
(e.g., welfare or resources, as explained in Part III.A).  Even though the distributional 
question involves many factors and nuances,156 it is generally accepted that promoting 
goals of wealth redistribution justifies coercive state action.157  
Philosophers and tax scholars tend to agree that, if wealth redistribution is 
explicitly incorporated into the social welfare function, the tax regime is an effective and 
efficient way of promoting it.158  This overall consensus does not downplay the serious 
normative questions as to whether this means that a just tax system has to be 
progressive.159  It also does not claim that achieving distributive justice is or should be 
the only or the primary objective of the tax regime.  It does however, reflect the notion 
that the tax system comprises a key, and some would say the prominent, element within 
                                                      
155 See Benshalom, supra note137, at 10–18. 
156 Id. at 34–36 (surveying these different layers). 
157 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149–74 (1974) (providing one 
notable exception). 
158 See CHARLES O. GALVIN & BORIS I. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: HOW PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT 
BE? 38–54 (1969) (arguing that income tax progressivity is necessary to offset certain regressive tendencies 
in other federal, state, and local taxes); Bankman & Griffith, supra note 73, at 1946-47 (saying that income 
tax progressivity is typically explained by proportionate sacrifice and the declining marginal utility of 
money); Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2004) 
(supporting progressive taxation on account of social science research that tries to estimate the marginal 
effect of wealth on individual happiness); Kaplow, supra note 120, at 39; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) (arguing that the tax-transfer regime redistributes in a way that results 
in comparatively less economic distortion than other legal rules); Kamin, supra note 47, at 244 (explaining 
how different measures of progressivity relate to different theories of distributive justice); Sugin, supra note 
64, at 2013–14.  But see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal 
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 208 (2003) (arguing against Kaplow and Shavell that the 
distinction between tax rules and legal rules is not always that clear).  For an example of regressive 
tendencies in federal spending, see Julia Lynn Coronado et al., The Progressivity of Social Security, 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Feb. 2000),  http://www.nber.org/papers/w7520 (concluding 
that Social Security taxes are regressive in part because lower income individuals have shorter average life 
spans than higher income individuals). 
159 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 8 (2002). 
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the arsenal of tools that policymakers have to promote redistribution of wealth.160  This 
suggests that modern liberal states should consider employing a progressive tax regime to 
meet their wealth-redistribution objectives.161  The use of progressive taxation also seems 
to carry significant support among the American public.162  
The second type of criticism asks whether more progressivity is warranted.  The 
reply to this criticism is that the current proposal does not contribute to the discussion of 
how progressive the tax system should be, but rather to the discussion of how a 
progressive tax system should be designed.  Policymakers could use our proposal to make 
the tax system more progressive, or they could use it to maintain a distributionally neutral 
tax regime—by, for example, reducing marginal tax rates, which would make the tax rate 
structure less steeply progressive.163   
The third line of potential criticism against our argument questions whether 
providing a realization-based income tax treatment to personal assets is the best way to 
promote income tax progressivity.  This criticism would stress that there are other, 
potentially more accurate ways to assure that the income tax regime has an overall 
progressive effect.  One of the biggest concerns is that giving a special realization 
treatment to personal assets, such as family farms and closely held family corporations, 
would encourage taxpayers to overinvest in them. 
The brief reply is that policymakers should not be asking whether providing 
realization tax treatment to personal assets would be the perfect way to promote tax 
progressivity.  Instead, the key inquiry is what course of action policymakers should take 
given the normative difficulty of drawing interpersonal comparisons with respect to the 
market price of personal assets.164  The more difficult it becomes to observe what we are 
trying to distribute, the more inaccurate and susceptible to abuse and the less 
redistributive the tax regime becomes.  Even if policymakers can observe the market 
price of personal assets, there would be questions of how much it could help them to 
promote redistribution.  The high probability that taxpayers attribute higher, yet 
heterogeneous, subjective values to personal assets raises questions of whether and how 
the market price signal of personal assets should be used for redistributive tax purposes.  
In the context of our argument, policymakers who want to use the tax regime to 
redistribute wealth and have only the market price of assets to do so face four 
alternatives.165  One is to maintain the current realization-based income tax regime and 
endure the enormous social costs associated with taxing all assets on a realization 
basis.166  The second alternative is to tax all assets on a mark-to-market basis—thus 
paying the costs of inaccuracy and perhaps regressivity of taxing personal assets based on 
their market value.  The third alternative would be to limit taxation to observable assets, 
to exempt personal assets altogether, or to shift to a more easily observed tax base—e.g., 
                                                      
160 See Sugin, supra note 64, at 2014 
161 See Kamin, supra note 47, at 253. 
162 See Michael J. Graetz, Taxes That Work: A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043, 1048–
52 (2006). 
163 See supra note 153. See also infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
164 This dilemma is an extension of a more general tradeoff that was identified by Joel Slemrod and 
Christian Traxler.  Joel B. Slemrod & Christian Traxler, Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 8 (Dec. 2010),  http://ssrn.com/paper=1534586. 
165 There are of course numerous other options if policymakers are willing to rely on factors other 
than the market price.  For a thorough discussion of this topic, see infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra Part I.A.  
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wages or consumption.167  This, however, would narrow the tax base and require very 
high marginal tax rates to attain redistribution.168  The fourth alternative, which this 
subpart explores, is to provide realization-based tax treatment only to those (personal) 
assets that are difficult to tax on a mark-to-market basis.  As established, if the realization 
requirement were applied only to personal assets, the tax base would become more 
progressive overall.  We concede that this method of attaining progressivity raises some 
concerns.  In its crude form, the realization requirement is not sensitive to the amount of 
personal assets individuals may have—allowing the middle class to relish the majority of 
the tax benefit.  Furthermore, as discussed in the next part, it would create incentives to 
over-invest in personal assets, which would result in tax-avoidance opportunities and 
complex administrative countermeasures.  Most importantly, by adopting realization as a 
way to promote progressivity, this article’s proposal inevitably accepts some of its 
inherent timing arbitrariness.   
Given these difficulties, it is important to examine whether higher personal 
exemptions or higher marginal tax rates can (by themselves) better achieve income tax 
progressivity.  Policymakers should therefore compare our proposal with a universal 
mark-to-market regime, which attains progressivity by adjusting the tax rate and level of 
personal exemptions rather than by providing realization treatment to personal assets.  
Tax progressivity is typically associated with the progressive tax rate structure 
rather than with the progressivity of the tax base.169  In fact, many of the arguments 
against progressivity relate to the social costs associated with the progressive rate 
structure as a method rather than to its underlying objective of promoting economic 
equality.170  It has been convincingly argued that progressive tax rate structures with high 
marginal tax rates cause or aggravate many of the notorious income tax complexities171 
and that they generate significant work and investment disincentives.172  
The actual behavioral impact of tax rate progressivity has been disputed,173 but it 
is difficult to deny that high progressive tax rates produce distortive incentives and tax-
planning opportunities.  It is therefore widely accepted that tax rate progressivity’s major 
drawback is the unavoidable tradeoff between allocating the tax burden equitably and 
reducing overall social productivity. 174   The high social costs of attaining overall 
progressivity of the tax system through high marginal tax rates suggest that policymakers 
would be wise to explore other means of achieving this goal.  In the context of this 
inquiry, tax policy analysis should focus on how to make the tax base more progressive.  
A more progressive base would allow policymakers to decrease high marginal tax rates 
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and thereby reduce the overall costs of employing a tax-driven wealth redistribution 
scheme.175  
Taxing personal assets on a realization basis is not the only way to make the 
income tax base more progressive.  Allowing for personal exemptions that are sensitive 
to economic hardship would also make the tax base more progressive as a whole.176  If 
this is true, a general mark-to-market regime could cover all assets (including personal 
assets), while personal exemptions could make the income tax more progressive.  It 
seems, however, that even a carefully structured mark-to-market regime that provides 
relatively generous personal exemptions would result in problematic interpersonal 
comparisons.  For example, as long as it relies upon the market price of personal assets as 
a benchmark, such a regime would impose a higher effective tax rate on the professor 
with the valuable assets than on her colleague with the less valuable ones.  
Finally, while we recognize that granting realization treatment only to personal 
assets would undoubtedly distort ownership patterns, there are reasons to believe that the 
impact of these distortions would not be huge.  Because of the high subjective value 
taxpayers attach to personal assets (and the costs of detaching from them), one can view 
most taxpayers as being neither short nor long on those assets.177  In other words, the 
ability of taxpayers to manipulate their holdings of these assets to achieve a tax advantage 
exists but is limited.  Taxpayers may not be as tax efficient when it comes to holding of 
personal assets—for example, if the taxpayer sells a residential real estate property, she 
becomes short on that property.  While she can rent for a while, the costs of shifting in 
and out from a residential property are high, which drives down the likelihood of 
manipulation.  Additionally, while granting realization treatment only to personal assets 
may result in overinvestment in businesses that fall under the personal asset category, 
there are other ways to address these concerns.178 
The fourth criticism, that exempting personal assets altogether or subjecting them 
to a lower rate is more consistent with this article’s claim that they are progressively 
distributed, is the most difficult objection.  One may wonder why a sale of a personal 
asset should trigger a tax at all.  If a taxpayer sells a personal asset, which he initially 
valued significantly more than the market price, it may be because he is actually less 
well-off.  For example, a taxpayer may have bought a residential home, enjoyed it very 
much, and been unwilling to sell it.  After a while, however, he may have found out that 
he was not that fond of the house anymore and may have sold it for its fair market value.  
In other words, the taxpayer sold his personal asset because he experienced a loss of 
utility with respect to it.  Because the realization event is a byproduct of a utility-loss 
(rather than gain), making it a trigger of taxation seems utterly unfair. 
We have two replies to this concern.  The first is that in public finance the focus 
is on rough justice rather than upon particular circumstances.  Hence, as mentioned in 
Part III.A, we focus on the distribution of personal assets as a class of assets rather than 
on the changes in the specific price of an asset.  Since personal assets comprise a bigger 
                                                      
175 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 73, at 1909–10 (making a related argument that the 
progressive tax rates are not sufficient to promote overall tax progressivity if the tax base is not sufficiently 
progressive). 
176 Blum & Kalven, supra note 170, at 506–11. 
177 We thank Michael Smart for this observation. 
178 For example, promoting risk diversification (e.g., regulated investment vehicles for retirement) 
and capping the benefit realization so that it only applies to a certain amount of personal assets.  See supra 
note 102.  See also infra notes 205–206. 
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share of low to medium-income taxpayers’ assets, then giving them an advantageous tax 
treatment would result in increased progressivity, even if in the case of a specific asset it 
may be difficult to see why the sale justifies triggering a tax.   
The second reply is that, as noted, in some extreme cases there may be a good 
reason to exempt the returns for personal assets altogether.179  However, in most cases 
there seems to be a strong case for taxing the income generated from the sale and use of 
personal assets.  For example, it seems unreasonable to tax individuals according to the 
market value of their human capital.  Although many healthy women can work as 
gestational surrogates, the market valuation of this ability is a poor indication of their 
economic well-being.180  The argument changes if a specific individual makes a voluntary 
decision to work as a surrogate. 181   The monetary returns for surrogacy are not 
fundamentally different from those received through other employment options.  If 
society chooses income as the relevant benchmark for measuring economic well-being, 
different sources of income should be treated the same.182  In this context, the realization 
principle operates to avoid problematic interpersonal comparisons with respect to human 
capital, while making sensible comparisons with respect to income actually earned.  
It is important to stress that this article’s analysis neither advocates nor rejects the 
notion that personal assets should be subject to a different tax rate—or even to a form of 
retrospective taxation.183  It merely suggests that even if the market price of assets is easy 
to observe, a mark-to-market tax regime should not apply to personal assets.  To accept 
our argument, one need not subscribe to the notion that realization-based treatment of 
personal assets provides an a priori superior way of promoting income tax progressivity.  
Instead, one need only accept that a mark-to-market regime has important benefits and 
that these benefits are not completely erased if some assets are exempt from it.   
The skeptical reader should further agree that, given the difficulties of drawing 
interpersonal comparisons with respect to the market price of personal assets, there are 
some important benefits of excluding them from the mark-to-market regime.  
Additionally, one should accept that there are high social costs to progressive tax rate 
structures with high marginal rates.  Given these costs, policymakers should be willing to 
consider achieving income tax progressivity through a combination of measures—
including the enhancement of the progressivity of the base.  A realization requirement 
                                                      
179 Selling wedding rings and other types of personal assets could signal extreme hardship, so it 
may be reasonable to exempt them altogether, given that the money received for them is not an adequate 
benchmark for interpersonal comparisons for well-being.  See supra Part III.B.  
180 Benshalom & Stead, supra note 15, at 1542–49. 
181 See generally Bridget J. Crawford, Taxing Surrogacy, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 
(Aug. 30, 2009),  http://ssrn.com/paper=1422180 (making the case for taxing surrogacy).  It is true that the 
decision to work as a surrogate may not be random—but rather an option chosen particularly by non-affluent 
women.  DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE 
OF CONCEPTION 73 (2006).  Furthermore, while personal preferences play a role in every employment 
decision, certain jobs (e.g., migrant labor) and economic decisions (e.g., selling body organs) are held or 
made only by very poor people.  E.g., CATHERINE WALDBY & ROBERT MITCHELL, TISSUE ECONOMIES: 
BLOOD, ORGANS, AND CELL LINES IN LATE CAPITALISM 161 (2006).  
182 See generally Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2008) (arguing 
that fairness prescribes taxing different sources of income equally).  
183 For discussion of retrospective taxation, see supra note 70.  Retrospective taxation would reduce 
the value of deferral and would de facto impose a higher effective rate on realized personal assets.  Therefore, 
because this article does not discuss what the effective tax rate on personal assets should be, we leave the 
question of retrospective taxation, its theoretical justifications and political viability, for a future paper. 
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that is confined to personal assets would provide a tax benefit, which would erode the 
theoretical ideal income tax base but would do so in an overall progressive way.  
The conclusion of this analysis is that there is a strong normative argument for 
shifting the current realization-based income tax system towards a decidedly more hybrid 
regime.  This hybrid system would distinguish between personal assets, which would be 
taxed upon realization, and emotionally fungible assets (namely, investment assets), 
which would be taxed under a mark-to-market regime.  Such a tax regime would broaden 
the tax base to include almost all investment assets and would make the income tax more 
progressive, efficient, and resistant to tax planning.  
Despite the above, critics may legitimately argue that there are other, 
theoretically superior, ways of promoting tax progressivity.  Nevertheless, we argue two 
things.  First, as we stress in this subpart, every tax (and transfer) distributive scheme 
involves certain social costs,184 so that the optimal redistributive policy may require using 
different elements rather than relying on a few of them extensively.  Second, as the next 
part suggests, tax policy should be pragmatic and not merely theoretically correct.  
The potential shift to a more hybrid income tax regime involves a number of 
complicated issues.  Hence, the normative justification for a hybrid tax regime does not 
automatically justify an actual shift to such a system.  The next part discusses how our 
proposal could help establish a better, more progressive tax system that would not require 
a complete overhaul of the existing income tax. 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD—PRELIMINARY POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This part examines how this article’s normative analysis could be meaningfully 
integrated into current tax arrangements.  Taking a radically different view of realization, 
this article offers only the foundational normative argument for a hybrid income tax 
regime.  It is part of a much broader project that seeks to re-examine how a more 
progressive and efficient income tax base should be structured, so a detailed policy 
proposal lies beyond the scope of the current analysis.  Instead, the discussion below 
seeks to draw attention to two major points.  First, it briefly explains how our argument 
supports a concrete and immediate change in the current tax regime—the taxation of all 
investment assets on a mark-to-market basis.  This proposal’s main benefits are that it 
broadens the income tax base while expanding its progressivity, it does not increase 
complexity because our current income tax regime already distinguishes investment 
assets and applies special rules to them, and it reduces much of the manipulation and 
economic dead weight loss associated with the realization requirement.  Put differently, 
this article’s proposal builds on a distinction already made by the current realization-
based income tax regime but derives more value from it without adding much complexity 
to the system.  
Second, proposing mark-to-market taxation of investment assets is only the first 
and most straightforward option for reform—but not, by any means, the only policy 
implication of this article’s analysis.  Offering the novel category of emotionally non-
fungible (personal) assets as a way to determine the tax treatment of assets suggests many 
more avenues of research.  This part outlines the main trajectories of likely future 
research and positions them within the scholarly literature. 
                                                      
184 See generally Lee A. Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare 
Conundrum, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 235 (1994) (reviewing the difficulties of using welfare distributive 
programs to reduce poverty and inequality due to labor market disincentives). 
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A. Taking the First Step: A Modest Real-World Reform Proposal 
The category of emotionally non-fungible personal assets may seem vague and 
difficult to monitor.  While this may be true, there is at least one category of assets that 
clearly cannot be identified as personal: investment assets.  Therefore, at the very 
minimum, our analysis suggests that investment assets should be taxed on a mark-to-
market basis.   
The advantages of such a system are straightforward—with respect to investment 
assets, all the problems mentioned in Part I.A would be eliminated.  Investment assets are 
the easiest vehicle for manipulating the realization requirement, particularly through 
inefficient practices such as strategic trading. 185   Mark-to-market treatment would 
eliminate tax barriers to the efficient allocation of investment assets and allow taxpayers 
to attain certain investment goals—such as risk diversification—without triggering a tax 
liability.  Furthermore, investment assets are disproportionately held by affluent 
taxpayers, so subjecting them to mark-to-market taxation would deny them the tax 
benefit of realization for these assets, thereby increasing the progressivity of the income 
tax base.186  
We can anticipate two main difficulties with such a proposal, neither of which is 
insurmountable.  The first is how to define investment assets, and the second is how our 
proposal would manage issues of valuation and liquidity.  With respect to the first 
problem, the category of investment assets should include individuals’ portfolio 
investment in financial markets, debt instruments, and any non-control equity holdings in 
entities.187  It is important to note that the current tax regime already employs rules that 
distinguish investment assets from other types of assets.188  These rules are biased against 
investment assets because they prevent taxpayers from using deductions generated by 
investment activity to offset the income derived from ordinary trade and business or as 
compensation for services.189  Congress and the U.S. Treasury enacted these rules as a 
response to one of the most basic tax planning strategies in a realization-based income tax 
regime:190 the acceleration of deductions generated by investment activity to reduce tax 
liability on income derived from other sources.191  The upshot of this discussion is that 
                                                      
185 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
187 Given its limited scope, this article cannot address the imposition of the corporate tax.  It is, 
however, worthwhile to note that a regime that employs a corporate tax on all large corporations would 
probably be subject to mark-to-market taxation on the entity level.  See generally Michael S. Knoll, An 
Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing for computing corporate income tax 
this way). 
188 One example is the passive loss limitations discussed below.  Another set of rules can be found 
in I.R.C. § 163 (West Supp. 2010), which limits the interest deduction of interest payments made to support 
investment assets. 
189 See I.R.C. § 469 (2006) (providing broad limitations for losses from “passive” activities).  The 
limitations of I.R.C § 469 and its associated regulations set out mechanical rules for determining whether an 
investment activity is active or passive, including the number of hours the investor dedicates to the activity. 
The rules were extremely effective at eliminating tax shelters marketed to individuals.  See GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, supra note 1, at 414–15; McCaffery, supra note 11, at 907. 
190 See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver 
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2005). 
191 See Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax 
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499, 501 (1989).  In the once prominent 
individual tax shelter industry, high-income earners would purchase non-control shares in businesses solely 
for the deductions the businesses generated.  A dentist in a high tax bracket, for example, might purchase a 
share in a sham real estate investment using nonrecourse debt solely to take advantage of depreciation 
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while it can certainly be difficult to make distinctions between types of holdings, this 
difficulty is not fatal to our proposal.  In fact, the current tax regime makes such 
distinctions all the time. 
With respect to the problems of valuation and liquidity, we concede that they 
might remain a source of concern under this proposal.  Instead, we argue that 
policymakers can address those problems much more easily in the context of investment 
assets than with respect to all assets.  Many investment assets are traded and therefore are 
relatively liquid and easy to value.  As noted earlier, we believe that liquidity problems 
are not detrimental to this proposal because the current literature has identified the need 
to make exceptions in such limited cases of low taxpayer liquidity.192   
Valuation is the main explanation for why the realization requirement has 
endured as a second best alternative193 and probably remains the main impediment to 
adopting a mark-to-market regime.194  Nevertheless, the notion that valuation will always 
render the mark-to-market alternatives impractical is likely to eventually fail.  If one 
assumes that public markets will continue to grow in both scope and scale195 and 
advancements in computation and data analysis will continue to grow at an increasing 
rate, then the implication of this is that the market prices of a growing number of assets 
will be more easily determined and observed in the foreseeable future.196  Hence, the 
notion that tax authorities would be able to value and tax assets under a mark-to-market 
income tax regime is realistic for an increasingly large proportion of investment assets.197 
Because current income arrangements rely on the ability to distinguish between 
investment assets and other assets, using these same distinctions to promote a hybrid 
mark-to-market regime would not add significant complexity to the system.  In other 
words, the costs of distinguishing between investment assets and other assets are already 
present in the current income tax regime.  While our proposal does not reduce these costs, 
it achieves many advantages of the mark-to-market regime, appears to be 
administratively feasible (if not now, then in the near future), and reduces the complexity 
of many other rules,198 along with much of the revenue loss and waste associated with tax 
planning.  
In terms of future research, we believe that the above proposal for taxing all 
investment assets on a mark-to-market basis would be a significant improvement over the 
current regime but is not necessarily the ideal solution.  Even though it is difficult to 
determine the precise efficiency and distributional outcomes of a hybrid regime, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
deductions generated by the investment.  Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, those deductions could offset 
(even to the point of wiping out) the taxpayer’s dentistry income.  Section 469 of the Internal Revenue Code 
and the associated regulations virtually eliminated these transactions by creating bright line rules to 
distinguish between ordinary and passive income and prohibiting passive deductions from being used to 
offset ordinary gains.  Among other requirements, I.R.C. § 469 demands that a taxpayer materially participate 
in an investment activity in order for proceeds from the activity to be considered ordinary income.  In 
actuality, the provisions establish clear (and arguably arbitrary) tests for what amounts to material 
participation (based mainly on the amount of time spent in the activity).    
192 See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
193 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 365-66. 
194 Id. at 369.  
195 See Benshalom & Stead, supra note 15, at 1557. 
196 See Schenk, supra note 12, at 374. 
197 See supra note 70 (discussing how administrative costs of valuation could be reduced by non-
annual and statistical valuation). 
198 See supra note 72. 
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believe that a more nuanced distinction between emotionally non-fungible assets may be 
possible. 199   This article’s analysis establishes why limiting realization benefits to 
personal assets would increase distributional fairness and calls for expanding mark-to-
market treatment to non-personal assets.  However, the remainder of this part stresses that 
the benefit of such an expansion should be weighed against its social costs.200   
B. Future Avenues of Research 
In suggesting a new category of personal assets, we lack empirics to propose any 
bolder tax reform proposal than what we have outlined with respect to investment assets.  
However, we believe that it is worthwhile to consider some potential areas in which this 
article's normative analysis could be developed.  Earlier, we described the realization 
literature as dealing with the consequences of tax assessment mistakes.201 
However, as we explained, market valuation issues should become less of a 
problem over time—a fact that only highlights the problem with personal assets.  If the 
long feared mistakes in market price assessment are indeed becoming less common, then 
the relative role of mistakes with respect to taxpayers’ subjective values of personal 
assets would increase.  Put differently, we believe that as market valuation of both 
personal and non-personal assets becomes more accurate, policymakers will more 
frequently have to confront the problem we identified: taxpayers’ economic well-being 
from personal assets is not accurately reflected in the assets’ market prices. Future 
research on this topic requires empirical inquiry about the relative proportions that 
personal assets represent in the overall pool of assets.  However, it should also focus on 
theoretical inquiries with respect to tax policy.  Another important issue in shifting to a 
hybrid regime is how tax authorities should distinguish between personal and non-
personal assets. We first explain the main theoretical threads of the topic and then 
elaborate on how they affect our argument for a hybrid mark-to-market realization 
regime.  
By their very nature, partial mark-to-market regimes differentiate the tax 
treatment of certain assets and taxpayers.  This differentiation may result in 
discontinuities that carry potential for distortions and inequities.202  The key element in 
determining whether a shift to a partial mark-to-market regime would be beneficial is 
whether tax authorities could easily distinguish between types of assets.  This is because 
such a shift would require tax authorities to develop a set of coherent and consistent 
recognition rules to distinguish between assets that should be taxed on a mark-to-market 
basis and those that should not.  The benefits and administrability of a partial mark-to-
market tax regime would turn on the precision of the recognition rules and the elasticity 
of demand for specific assets.  Applying mark-to-market taxation to assets that are very 
elastic—perhaps because there are many non-mark-to-market assets that can easily 
substitute for them—would be difficult or counterproductive.  If taxpayers could 
                                                      
199 Mark P. Gergen, The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading Under Realization, 
Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation, 49 TAX L. REV. 209, 216 (1994).   
200 Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. 
REV. 503, 504 (2005) (arguing that not every movement away from realization towards accrual taxation is 
desirable and that each step should be judged by its revenue gains and efficiency costs).  
201 See supra Part III.B. 
202 Taxpayers have incentives to tax plan against the fractional hybrid regime.  Schenk, supra note 
200, at 519-24.  For example, taxpayers could include much of their debt within the scope of the mark-to-
market regime while shifting their appreciated assets outside of it.  See Shakow, supra note 9, at 1165–66; 
Weisbach, supra note 1, at 128. 
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costlessly transition to a substitute, most would try to do so, which would result in no 
social gain in terms of revenue, efficiency, or equity.203  In this type of situation it may be 
advisable to either avoid mark-to-market taxation of the asset or include some of its 
substitutes as well.204 
An example could help identify some of the main difficulties of drawing a 
distinction between assets in a hybrid income tax regime, which taxes all non-personal 
assets on a mark-to-market basis.  Consider Gill Bates, a young businesswoman who 
created a start-up internet company that captured a significant market share.  Even though 
the company made an initial public offering, Bates continues to manage the company and 
maintains significant holdings in its stock.  Bates could argue that even though the shares 
are liquid and easy to value, their (substantial) appreciation should only be taxed upon 
realization.  For years, she has invested her human capital in the corporation and plans to 
continue doing so.  Accordingly, there seems to be a lot of truth in the claim that her 
holding in the corporation’s stock is an emotionally non-fungible asset.  
Allowing Bates’s holdings to be taxed only upon realization would, nevertheless, 
be problematic from a number of perspectives. First, taxing her holdings in the 
corporation only upon realization would have significant costs in terms of revenue and 
progressivity.205  Second, if her holdings were not taxed on a mark-to-market basis, she 
would have incentives to try and manipulate her tax liabilities. For example, she could 
overinvest in the assets that could be labeled as emotionally non-fungible and defer the 
tax payment on their appreciation. She could use the corporation to attain risk 
diversification by retaining the corporation’s earnings and using them to buy a diversified 
portfolio so that her holdings in the corporation partially reflected the value of this 
portfolio.206  This, as mentioned, would result in misallocation of resources, less risk 
diversification, more administrative and compliance costs, and all the flaws of the current 
realization regime.  
It is important to note that this example is not an indication that a hybrid tax 
regime is impossible to implement but rather a demonstration of the fact that pushing a 
single principle to an extreme can present complex questions that may not apply across 
the board.  Admittedly, our analysis suggests that emotionally non-fungible assets should 
be taxed only upon realization in order to prevent errors related to subjective valuation.  
The analysis does not in any way suggest that preventing this type of error is the only 
objective of the tax system.  Revenue, distributive, and tax enforcement objectives may 
require that this goal be balanced against other values.  In the case of Bates, these 
considerations may require that her ability to claim realization treatment for emotionally 
non-fungible assets be capped at a certain dollar amount.  This capping, however, would 
still recognize the basic point advanced by this analysis: realization is a normative 
component of how a liberal society values individual well-being and promotes 
redistribution.  
                                                      
203 See Schenk, supra note 200, at 527–28. 
204 See Gergen, supra note 199, at 211 (suggesting that putting only publicly traded assets in the 
mark-to-market regime would make it administrable but would nevertheless have troubling consequences 
because it would create a bias for non-publicly traded assets). 
205 This concern is substantial given that much of the wealth of high net worth taxpayers is in the 
form of closely held business equity. See Kennickel, supra note 114, at 53–55.  See also infra Appendix. 
206 In this case, holding a share in a corporation is a close substitute to holding a diversified 
portfolio. 
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As one commentator has noted, the weaknesses of both pure realization and pure 
mark-to-market regimes leave policymakers with no option but to balance between 
them.207  A hybrid regime requires line drawing between similar assets—a practice that is 
always difficult and somewhat arbitrary.208  Wherever the line is drawn, assets on each 
side will be assigned different tax treatment in spite of their strong similarities.209  
Nevertheless, a frictionless tax regime is not a possibility, so line drawing will always be 
a significant component of tax policy debates.210  Accordingly, any future research 
exploring the nature of a hybrid mark-to-market regime will have to evaluate whether the 
line drawing associated with the research is comparatively easier or less distorting than 
those associated with the one it seeks to replace. 
We wish to end by noting a set of broader policy issues to which this article’s 
argument relates.  First, with respect to the income-tax-versus-consumption-tax debate, if 
an effective hybrid income tax regime could be developed along the lines suggested by 
this article, then recent calls of some leading tax scholars to abandon the income tax are 
premature and misleading.211  Although the realization requirement is indeed inherent to 
income taxation, limiting its role to personal assets can reduce many of the problems of 
the income tax and sustain it as a much more progressive and effective fiscal instrument.   
Second, a shift to a more hybrid mark-to-market tax regime highlights other 
vexing tax policy questions, particularly with respect to the budgeting process.  A mark-
to-market tax regime would have to take account of more gains during economic booms 
and more losses during economic downturns, and would therefore require a very strong 
political commitment to prudent countercyclical spending.212  Additionally, a shift to a 
hybrid mark-to-market tax regime would call into question the desirability of taxing 
income rather than wealth.  
Third, from a historical perspective, it seems as though much of the justification 
for taxing income in the first place was the necessity of relying on the realization event to 
determine the actual value of assets.  There are, of course, independent arguments for 
why income rather than other tax bases such as consumption or wealth should be taxed.213  
However, once the historical connection between income and the realization requirement 
is weakened, the question of whether income tax is the most appropriate tax base merits 
re-examination.  
Finally, and most importantly, we have argued that current tax literature relies on 
tax administration difficulties with respect to valuation of assets to justify the realization 
requirement.  This article’s argument is a byproduct of tax authorities’ inability to use the 
market price as a good proxy to determine the well-being (or other currencies of justice) 
associated with an asset.  One may observe that our argument can also be viewed as an 
                                                      
207 Schenk, supra note 12, at 396. 
208 Benshalom, supra note 43, at 1259–71; Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1631. 
209 This of course assumes that some attributes of the tax code are politically fixed. See Weisbach, 
supra note 33, at 1631–32. 
210 See generally Weisbach, supra note 33 (claiming that line drawing problems are inherent to tax 
law). 
211 See generally Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 7 (arguing that a consumption tax is desirable 
on the grounds that the income tax cannot meet its distributional objectives).  See also McCaffery & Hines, 
supra note 6. 
212 Needless to say, such a commitment does not exist in the current political arena.  DANIEL N. 
SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOV’T’S MARCH TOWARD BANKR. 116–47 (2006). 
213 See, e.g., Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1081, 1093-94 (1980). 
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administrative constraint.  After all, we start by explaining that the main problem with 
realization, as it is perceived today, is the difficulty of making accurate market price 
valuations.  Our claim is that this ability to make accurate market valuations may change 
over time and that the real problem is the inability of tax authorities to measure the 
subjective value (or utility) that individuals derive from personal assets.  One can claim 
that policymakers’ capacities to observe utility may change over time.  These two types 
of constraints should be distinguished.  The current market valuation constraint is 
something that technology can change, and is actually in the process of changing.  As a 
field in finance, asset pricing constantly advances, so that an increasing number of assets 
can be consistently and cheaply priced.  This is not the case with the gap-in-value 
argument because technology cannot help us measure welfare and other benchmarks of 
economic well-being.  For this reason, policymakers cannot avoid making some 
normative assumptions about how to measure well-being for tax purposes.214  This article 
cannot explore this point, but it is important to note that, ideologically, we would 
welcome a discussion about the limits of market price as a proxy.  Such a discussion 
would depart from what seems to be the current orthodoxy within tax law, which focuses 
almost exclusively on the virtues of the market price as an objective, value neutral 
measurement of economic well-being.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis explains why realization should play a normative role in 
modern income tax regimes.  This role intimately relates to the way liberal egalitarian 
societies should promote notions of distributive justice.  
Rather than summarizing our points, we wish to highlight the article’s main 
contribution to legal literature discussing tax-distributive schemes.  First, the dominant 
role of the realization requirement in the income tax framework indicates that 
administrative difficulties will not stifle a normative-distributive analysis of its function.  
The income tax regime is a vital instrument for achieving redistribution in liberal 
democracies, so academics and policymakers should see a concrete distributive analysis 
of its attributes as a necessity.   
Second, by emphasizing the importance of the difference between market and 
subjective valuation with respect to certain personal assets, this article encourages a new 
paradigmatic thinking about realization.  The enormous social costs associated with 
realization should prompt serious consideration of how to advance a progressive hybrid 
income tax regime.  Such a regime would not be flawless but would attain the preferred 
level of tax-redistribution in a much more efficient and equitable way. 
Finally, this article calls for a re-examination of the role that market price plays 
in contemporary tax theory.  This is not to suggest that market price and its related 
efficiency implications offer no value but simply that reality is far more nuanced.  Market 
price is just one way to describe individuals’ economic well-being for distributive 
purposes, but there are other objective and subjective ways.  Good policymaking requires 
trying, to the extent possible, to make the best account of them all. 
                                                      
214 For example, policymakers could say that the value of a taxpayer’s personal assets should be 
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Appendix: Asset Distribution tables by income level 2001: Demonstrating the proportional holdings of personal, investment and 
business asset classes by different groups of taxpayers. 
 
Distribution of all Assets: assets and liabilities as a share of total assets by percentile groups of distribution of wealth (%)
215
 
  all 0-50 50-90 90-95 95-99 99-100 
#1 Total financial assets 42.2 19.1 35.9 50.7 47.9 45.1 
#2 
Total of non-financial assets  
(home equity+ "other assets" + investment real estate) 57.8 80.9 64.1 49.3 52.1 54.9 
#3 Investment in non-residential real estate 4.2 1.6 4.2 4.7 6.1 4.6 
#4 Investment in residential real estate 4.7 0.5 2.3 3.7 7.1 6.5 
#5 Investment in the equity of a (closely held) business 16.9 1.1 5.6 9.5 18 33.5 
        
 Distribution by category       
#6 Total of investment assets (1+3+4) 51.1 21.2 42.4 59.1 61.1 56.2 
#7 Total of non-business personal assets (2-3-4-5) 32 77.7 52 31.4 20.9 10.3 
#8 Total of business assets (5) 16.9 1.1 5.6 9.5 18 33.5 
 Total assets (6+7+8) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
                                                      
215 See Kennickel, supra note 114, at 53–55. 
